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A growing literature examines the influence of a country’s legal system on financial outcomes. In an 
early paper, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) suggest that differences in coun-
tries’ legal systems and the enforcement of laws can be linked to cross-country variation in the size of 
capital markets, firms’ access to those markets, and ownership concentration in firms. Klapper and 
Love (2004) present evidence that firm-level corporate governance matters more in countries that 
have relatively weak legal environments. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) argue that differences in the law 
and regulation of the banking sector, as well as differences in corporate governance, can explain a 
significant proportion of cross-country differences in banks’ performance in the 2007–2008 credit 
crisis. Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2016) examine changes in EU market regulation across European 
countries and find significant differences in the effect of these directives, with liquidity benefits 
stronger in countries that have stricter implementation and enforcement of rules, as well as higher-
quality regulatory procedures. Overall, these papers and other research that followed provide strong 
evidence that the legal environment is an important determinant of the characteristics of capital mar-
kets, whether and how firms access these markets, and the structure and effects of corporate govern-
ance inside firms. 
In this paper, we contribute to this literature on law and finance by empirically analyzing the 
impact of the introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) on a cross-country sample of firms. This 
setting offers significant advantages when analyzing the effect of the legal environment on the firm. 
Existing research argues that the introduction of CDSs can significantly affect decisions made by the 
firm; given the mechanisms described in these papers, this impact crucially depends on the legal and 
market environment that the firm faces.1 In particular, the extent to which CDS contracts, which are 
typically governed by English or U.S. law, affect creditor rights depends on the benchmark rights that 
creditors have in the absence of CDSs. These benchmark rights differ across countries and depend on 
a country’s existing bankruptcy codes, contract enforcement, and corporate governance mechanisms. 
In addition, although models suggest that the impact of CDS introduction may differ substantially 
across countries, existing empirical work has examined these effects primarily in North American 
                                                 
1 For example, Saretto and Tookes (2013), Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014), and Bolton and Oehmke (2015) sug-
gest that the introduction of CDSs to underlying firms can significantly affect creditors’ ability to enforce their claim or 
affect their priority in bankruptcy. These effects depend on the bankruptcy code to which the firms are subject and may 
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firms. In sharp contrast, we examine whether cross-country differences in institutional structures, par-
ticularly with regard to the legal codes governing the firm, influence the impact of the introduction of 
CDS trading on the underlying corporate financial policies. Our results provide insight into the im-
portance of specific aspects of the legal environment for key economic quantities, such as the capital 
structure of firms. Indeed, the results of existing work suggest that, at the country level, creditor rights 
and the quality of the legal system are important determinants of the depth of credit markets. For 
example, Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) report that, in a sample of 129 countries, an increase 
in a (combined) creditor rights index of one unit is associated with an increase in the ratio of private 
credit to gross domestic product (GDP) of almost 6%. In contrast, a decrease in the quality of the 
legal system, measured by the number of days that contract enforcement requires, is associated with a 
significant decrease in the ratio of private credit to GDP. 
To motivate our tests, we begin with the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model of the ‘empty 
creditor’ problem, where CDSs can substantially change the relation between the firm and its creditors 
in distress by attenuating or severing the link between cash flow rights and control rights. In the limit, 
an individual who holds both CDS and the underlying debt may have little or no interest in the (effi-
cient) continuation of the firm (see, e.g., Hu and Black 2008a, 2008b; Bolton and Oehmke 2011). We 
extend this structural framework to allow for uncertainty regarding whether an action taken by a firm 
triggers a credit event for CDSs held on the firm’s debt. This uncertainty captures differences in the 
way that local bankruptcy codes interact with the standardized definitions of CDS contract terms 
established by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). If there is less uncertainty 
that a particular action will trigger payments related to CDSs, the environment is considered more 
creditor friendly. For plausible parameter values, we demonstrate that the introduction of CDSs in-
creases debt capacity more in regimes with less uncertainty regarding credit events. The intuition is 
similar to that of Bolton and Oehmke (2011): well-functioning credit derivative contracts, such as 
CDSs, can allow firms to overcome limited-commitment problems that arise due to weak institutional 
heritages. However, these benefits are larger when there is less uncertainty about the enforcement of 
obligations due under the swap contracts. Overall, the results from our extended model highlight that 
the real effects of CDSs on reference entities depend on features of the home country’s legal environ-
ment.2 
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We conduct our empirical analysis using a sample of more than 56,000 firms from 51 countries 
during the period 2001–2015. The use of an international sample provides us with cross-sectional 
variation in the legal environment, particularly creditor rights, which may influence the effect of the 
introduction of CDSs. In addition, our international sample also has cross-country variation in other 
dimensions, such as the degree of contract enforceability and the degree of shareholders’ ownership 
concentration. Existing theory implies that these features of the legal and market environment can be 
important determinants of the effects of CDS introduction, and a global sample may allow for better 
inferences about whether these variables play a significant role in those effects. To our knowledge, 
this research is the first to empirically analyze the consequences of CDS trading for nonfinancial firms 
in a global context. Therefore, it also provides the first detailed, large-scale, out-of-sample evidence 
for the effect of CDSs on corporate financial policies beyond prior U.S. studies.3 
An analysis of the effects of CDS introduction must, by necessity, consider endogeneity biases, 
since CDS introduction is not random. These potential biases may be related to characteristics of 
firms, as well as to key attributes of firms’ home countries. We address these concerns using a relatively 
new econometric technique that has not previously been used in the finance literature. We first esti-
mate the market’s propensity to introduce CDSs to firms, using an extensive array of firm and country 
characteristics, and then use the resultant propensity scores as a weighting mechanism for the sample 
in our analysis. This novel “overlap weighting” approach, developed by Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky 
(2018), generates similar distributions of all firm- and country-level covariates across CDS firms and 
non-CDS firms and allows us to make causal inferences on the effects of CDS introduction on cor-
porate financial and investment policies. Although we use a wide array of covariates, we also conduct 
a sensitivity analysis to examine whether our results are affected by omitted variable bias. 
Our results indicate that after CDS introductions the underlying firms increase leverage in 
countries that have stronger creditor rights along specific dimensions. The first dimension is the re-
quirement for creditor consent in order to enter reorganization, which can act as a trigger for CDS 
obligations. This result is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical framework: creditors with 
CDS protection and control over shareholders’ entry into reorganization have substantially higher 
bargaining power, allowing the firms to overcome the limited-commitment problem related to the ex 
                                                 
3 In their survey of the CDS literature, Augustin et al. (2014, p. 19) state that “a broader use of CDS data in international 
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ante issuance of debt. Indeed, the private renegotiation setting is also the one in which Bolton and 
Oehmke (2011: 2631) argue that the “main effect of CDS protection” occurs, since it is in this instance 
that the swaps improve the lender’s bargaining position. 
The second dimension that influences the impact of CDS introduction is the requirement that 
secured creditors be paid first out of liquidation proceeds. This indicates that leverage increases are 
greater when liquidation costs are low, particularly when ex post excessive liquidation pressure may 
come from empty creditors with CDS protection. 
We also find that underlying firms increase leverage more in countries with weaker contract 
enforceability, and if their equity ownership is more concentrated, as shareholders would have greater 
bargaining power. These results indicate that the introduction of CDSs can act as a substitute for weak 
property rights, especially in situations in which poor enforceability of property rights is a constraint 
on the supply of credit in the domestic capital market. This is consistent with the finding of Bae and 
Goyal (2009) that, along with creditor rights, property rights are an important determinant of the credit 
available to firms. In addition, newly introduced CDS contracts effectively enhance the debt capacity 
of underlying reference entities when creditors initially have an inferior bargaining position with re-
spect to majority shareholders (Davydenko and Strebulaev 2007), who would have more bargaining 
power during private debt renegotiation in the absence of CDSs. 
We perform a number of robustness checks on our results. In addition to the sensitivity anal-
ysis of omitted variables mentioned above, these tests include the use of additional control variables; 
a test of the conditional independence of our treatment assignment using alternative ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimations; the use of CDS existence rather than CDS introduction as the variable of 
interest; an analysis of a subsample that excludes U.S. firms (as well as other country filters); an analysis 
that excludes potential “national champions” from the sample; and longer-horizon effects of CDS 
introductions. The results from these tests remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
Although our primary focus is on financing effects, we also briefly explore the effects of CDS 
introduction on investment, to better understand whether observed effects on leverage have implica-
tions for firms’ assets. These results show that the interaction between CDS contracts and local bank-
ruptcy codes also influences the investment policies of firms. Specifically, in cases with creditor re-
strictions on firms’ entry into bankruptcy, the presence of CDSs increases the level of capital invest-






/rfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhab092/6357050 by guest on 31 August 2021
5 
1. Review of the Related Literature 
While financial derivatives have been around for more than three decades, CDS are a much more 
recent phenomenon. Given the role of CDSs in the recent financial crisis (Stulz 2010), the existing 
literature has focused primarily on their role with regard to financial institutions. Similarly, the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis has triggered interest in using CDS to study sovereign risk (see, e.g., Acharya, 
Drechsler, and Schnabl 2014; Lee, Naranjo, and Sirmans 2016). In contrast, while an extensive litera-
ture has investigated the use of derivatives on currencies, interest rates, and commodity prices by non-
financial firms and the underlying frictions that justify their existence (see, e.g., Bartram, Brown, and 
Conrad 2011; Bartram, Brown, and Fehle 2009), much less attention has been paid to the effect of CDSs 
on these firms.4 Like equity derivatives, CDS are typically not held by the reference entity; that is, 
nonfinancial firms are generally not CDS users. Rather, some of their claimholders (e.g., bondholders) 
may use CDS contracts for hedging or speculative purposes. Nevertheless, a developing, relatively 
recent literature suggests that CDS may still affect various corporate policies of the underlying firms.5 
Although CDS are, in theory, redundant derivative assets, existing research indicates that mar-
ket frictions related to these contracts are nontrivial, and hence that the introduction of CDSs can 
have significant effects on security prices, economic incentives, and investor and firm behavior. These 
effects drive a wedge between the payoffs on the underlying asset (the firm’s assets) and the payoff 
on the derivative instrument (the CDS contract).6 No consensus has been reached in the literature 
about the net impact of CDSs on the underlying firms. CDSs can clearly provide better hedging op-
portunities for lenders, but these opportunities may be associated with inefficiencies, such as excessive 
liquidation, reduced monitoring by lenders, and increased losses to creditors in default. However, by 
improving creditor rights, CDSs also may be associated with higher leverage, greater levels of invest-
ment, and less-frequent strategic default. Importantly, all of these effects are related to the creditor 
rights, property rights, and market framework in which the underlying entity operates. As noted above, 
                                                 
4 See Aretz and Bartram (2010) for a comprehensive review of the literature and evidence. 
5 See Augustin et al. (2014, 2016) for exhaustive surveys of the literature. 
6 Beyond the empty creditor problem in Bolton and Oehmke (2011), the existence of CDSs may affect the financing 
structure of firms by influencing the monitoring intensity of lenders (Morrison 2005) and by affecting investors’ incentives 
to hold synthetic debt rather than primary debt, particularly during economic expansions (Oehmke and Zawadowski 2016; 
Campello and Matta 2013). Other authors have modeled the impact of CDSs on liquidity policies and real investment 
through their effects on monitoring by creditors and risk sharing (see, e.g., Parlour and Winton 2013; Subrahmanyam, 
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this framework includes bankruptcy codes, contract enforcement, and corporate governance mecha-
nisms. 
The existing empirical work provides evidence that U.S. firms with CDSs have higher leverage 
ratios and longer debt maturity (Saretto and Tookes 2013), though only limited evidence suggests that 
the greater use of credit derivatives is associated with the greater supply of bank credit (Hirtle 2009). 
The existence of CDS does not affect the cost of debt on average, but riskier firms experience an 
increase in spreads, while safer firms, as well as those firms with a priori high strategic default incen-
tives, experience a decline in spreads (see Ashcraft and Santos 2009; Kim 2016). 
Evidence on the effect of CDSs on firms’ risk is mixed. Several papers present evidence that 
the credit risk of firms increases when CDS are introduced. For example, Peristiani and Savino (2011) 
and Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) report that U.S. firms’ credit ratings tend to decline and 
bankruptcy risk increases following CDS introduction, and Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi (2019) show 
that CDS increase the bankruptcy risk and lower the value of firms with powerful shareholders. Na-
rayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018) show that firm value declines as a result of increased costs of capital 
and lower credit quality when CDS are initiated. In contrast, Caglio, Darst, and Parolin (2019) employ 
transaction-level data to build a new aggregate measure of CDS use and find that CDS positions of 
the largest U.S. banks do not adversely affect borrower credit risk, even for lenders that overinsure 
against credit losses. Bedendo, Cathcart, and El-Jahel (2016) do not find an association between CDS 
and credit deterioration, and Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri (2015) show that CDS firms do not 
go bankrupt at a higher rate. 
A smaller set of papers examine the effect of CDSs on investment. Chakraborty, Chava, and 
Ganduri (2015) find that firms with CDSs decrease investment after covenant violations. Narayanan 
and Uzmanoglu (2018) present evidence that investment declines with CDS initiation. Danis and 
Gamba (2018) develop a model that shows that firms increase leverage and invest more after the 
introduction of CDSs. 
While the evidence to date indicates that CDS contracts have significant effects on the finan-
cial decisions of firms, the reference entities in almost all of these papers are headquartered in North 
America and, as a result, are subject to similar legal environments. The results of our theoretical frame-
work indicate that the effects of CDS introduction on leverage should be larger in countries with 
creditor-friendly bankruptcy codes, weaker contract enforceability, and higher concentration of share-
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differ with variation in the governance and legal environments in which the underlying reference en-
tities operate. 
2. CDS and the Local Legal Environment 
A single-name CDS contract specifies the underlying reference entity; the maturity of the contract; the 
ongoing payments that are required to be made by the protection buyer to the protection seller; the 
definition of the credit events that would trigger an obligation due from the protection seller to the 
protection buyer; the manner in which the payments from seller to buyer will be determined; and the 
manner in which the contractual securities may be delivered (physically or otherwise) will be set. There 
are six CDS trigger events: bankruptcy, obligation acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay, re-
pudiation/moratorium, and restructuring. Three of these—bankruptcy, failure to pay, and restructur-
ing—are principal credit events for corporate CDSs. When a trigger event occurs, CDS are settled 
through credit-default auctions, in which final recovery rates are determined through dealer bids, and 
the contract counterparties are settled accordingly either in cash or with the physical delivery of the 
underlying debt obligations. 
CDS contracts are typically governed by rules established by the ISDA and make use of a 
standard set of clauses set out in the ISDA Master Agreement. Despite standard language, in the early 
days of CDS contracts there were significant disagreements and subsequent litigation over contract 
terms, including whether credit events had actually occurred, and thus whether obligations had been 
triggered. Over the last 15 years, the ISDA has instituted changes in its Master Agreement in order to 
minimize ambiguity, create a more homogeneous CDS product, reduce counterparty risk, and stream-
line the processes through which settlement payments are determined. The most significant changes 
were included in the Big Bang Protocol in 2009. This protocol sets up regional Determination Com-
mittees (DCs) to consider whether a credit event has occurred, and to manage the auction process 
through which final CDS payments are settled. It also created common “look-back” provisions for 
credit events to reduce basis risk for CDS traders. In addition, restructuring was excluded as a credit 
event for North American reference entities (although this was retained as a potential credit event in 
the rest of the world). 
While these changes have created a more standardized CDS contract, the legal environment 
in which a reference entity operates is still important. Historically, Chapter 11 proceedings in the 
United States are the most common CDS credit event trigger in the world, but reference entities that 
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their creditor protections, including the grants of automatic stays, prohibitions on debt payments, 
preservation of legal rights, and the length and timing of the resolution process. For CDS contracts, 
these differences influence decisions regarding whether a credit event has occurred and could also 
influence the timing of settlement auctions in cases in which a credit event is deemed to have occurred. 
For example, ISDA’s EMEA (Europe) DC reached a surprising split decision on whether CDS 
were triggered upon the bankruptcy filing by Abengoa, a Spanish reference entity. In this case, local 
Spanish insolvency law and the global ISDA credit event definition provided conflicting interpreta-
tions of the nature of the underlying credit event.7 In Appendix A, we provide more details on the 
Abengoa case, as well as an example of another recent case in which the consideration of specific 
elements of a country’s bankruptcy code played an important role in the enforcement of CDS. 
As these examples demonstrate, there can be significant legal issues to consider in the deter-
mination of contingent payoffs associated with CDS contracts. These issues motivate our analysis of 
the ways in which local bankruptcy provisions affect the enforcement of single-name CDS contracts 
and, as a result, the payoffs of the firms’ creditors. In our formal model, we take into account this 
uncertainty about whether actions taken by the firm trigger payments due under the CDS contract. 
3. Data 
Our sample consists of all firms that have market data available on Datastream and accounting data 
available on WorldScope. We exclude financial firms, specifically, banks, insurance companies, real 
estate and other investment trusts, etc. with SIC codes 60–69. We also exclude all firm-year observa-
tions that have zero or negative values for total assets. Further, we exclude nonprimary issues, U.S. 
OTC Bulletin Board and “Pink Sheet” stocks, and firms that have missing country or firm identifiers. 
Our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 firms across 51 countries over 
the period 2001–2015. For these firms, we obtain monthly stock returns in U.S. dollars (USD), and 
market capitalization (in both USD and local currency) for individual stocks, as well as returns on the 
value-weighted local and global Datastream stock market indexes. Accounting variables are in millions 
of units of local currency and include determinants of CDS availability as well as general firm charac-
teristics (such as total assets, sales, profitability, leverage, and cash and short-term investments). All 
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firm-level variables are winsorized at the top and bottom five percentiles, with logical limits applied 
to mitigate the effect of data errors. 
Industry fixed effects are based on the Fama-French 48-industry classification. Various legal, 
institutional, and financial market characteristics across countries are obtained from the data available 
from other existing studies (La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007; Djankov, Hart, 
et al. 2008; and others), as well as from several major cross-country databases, including those of the 
World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and from PRS Group’s International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Finally, all CDS data are obtained from Markit. 
Firms are identified as reference entities if they have CDS of any maturity during the observa-
tion year. Because our CDS data start in 2001, we can only identify CDS introductions beginning in 
2002. When we refer to CDS firms and non-CDS firms, this pertains specifically to firm-year obser-
vations with and without CDS introductions, respectively. Thus, prior to CDS introduction, firm-year 
observations of eventual CDS firms are treated as non-CDS firms. To focus our identification on the 
introduction of CDSs, we do not include in our main results any firm-year observations of CDS firms 
after the introduction of CDSs. Appendix D provides variable definitions, and panel A of Table E1 
in Appendix E provides summary statistics for all the variables used in this paper. 
4. Insights and Empirical Predictions from a Structural CDS Model 
4.1 Setup 
We consider a setting that is an extension of a model proposed by Bolton and Oehmke (2011).8 In 
this setting, we develop key insights and testable implications for our international sample. Suppose a 
firm raises an amount, B, of debt today (time 0) by promising a fixed payment, F, at time 1. At time 1, 
the firm generates a cash flow, C1, which may be either 1
HC with probability θ or 1
LC with probability 
(1 ) , where 1 1
L HC C  (H = “high,” L = “low”). 1
LC  is normalized to zero without loss of gener-
ality. Soon after time 1, the firm’s continuation value, C2 (either 2
HC  with probability  or 2
LC  with 
probability (1  ), where 2 2
L HC C ), is known with certainty to the firm’s shareholders. However, 
                                                 
8 Our theoretical framework is intended to provide a simple and intuitive comparative statics result that summarizes our 
key idea about the effects of legal uncertainty in the recognition of the underlying trigger event of CDS. We do not develop 
an equilibrium model that derives the socially optimal level of the CDS notional amount, nor do we assume that the CDS 
notional amount that we observe in the data is socially optimal. Given the highly idiosyncratic nature of corporate bank-
ruptcy, we simply contend that it is ex ante infeasible to perfectly hedge against ex post legal risk in the recognition of the 
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there is limited verifiability of the cash flow to creditors; that is, they can verify only 1
LC , but not the 
magnitude of 1
HC , at time 1. The continuation value of the firm, C2, also cannot be verified by the 
firm’s creditors without incurring costs. If verification costs are paid by shareholders, the exact state 
of the world at time 2 is observable for both the firm’s insiders (i.e., its shareholders) and its outside 
claimants (i.e., creditors). We set the risk-free discount rate to zero to keep the notation simple, with-
out loss of generality. 
At time 1, if the firm fails to pay F, the firm and its creditors start private debt renegotiation. 
During this out-of-court debt negotiation, either creditors can liquidate the firm (e.g., via outright liqui-
dation as in Chapter 7 of the U.S. bankruptcy law), yielding the liquidation value S, or they can get a 
renegotiation surplus of qC2. In this surplus, the term C2 takes into account that only a fraction of 
the continuation value is available, due to the costs of private renegotiation; <1. C2 is therefore the 
maximum renegotiation surplus that accrues to both the firm and the creditors, taken together; q de-
notes the creditors’ bargaining power relative to that of the firm (i.e., its shareholders), which reduces 
the value available to the latter. Based on the insight provided by Hart and Moore (1994), liquidation 
is typically costlier than renegotiation (  2
LS C ) due to the destruction of the firm’s going-concern 
value in the event of liquidation, and hence shareholders and creditors are motivated to avoid it. 
When creditors owning CDS protection reject a renegotiation offer from the firm’s sharehold-
ers, they submit a request to the DC to verify whether a credit event was, in fact, triggered.9 As dis-
cussed in Appendix A, there is significant variation in legal risk across country jurisdictions due to 
differences in legal frameworks and to the resultant conflicting interpretations of the definition of the 
underlying credit event (see also Simmons & Simmons LLP 2016). Based on this variation, we assume 
that there is a probability ε that a credit event is not triggered. As a specific example of this, consider 
a case in which the firm could credibly claim that an in-court restructuring filing is voluntary, rather 
than related to a credit event; this possibility would reduce the bargaining power of creditors.10 
                                                 
9 Prior to the Big Bang in 2009, which required the formation of regional Determination Committees, legal uncertainties 
related to the triggering of CDSs were much more severe, since every legal dispute had to be resolved bilaterally between 
the protection sellers and buyers or tried in local courts (Gelpern and Gulati 2012). 
10 See, for example, Tu (2017): “Noble’s Chairman Paul Brough said on Tuesday it expects to find a buyer for its oil 
business by the end of September and get an extension on its covenant waivers . . . . Getting those things done would give 
the company room to settle a repayment plan with its banks and avoid default, Brough said.” See also Harrison and Whittall 
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Under these circumstances, creditors with CDS credit protection with a notional value of N 
maximize their expected payoff during the private debt renegotiation with the firm. Their payoff is 
max[q 2 ,
HC N] if i = H at time 2, where     (1 )N N M with M N ; and max[q 2 ,
LC N] if 
i = L. In each state, the first term in the square brackets denotes the payoff to CDS creditors if they 
agree with the firm on debt restructuring, whereas the second term in the square brackets denotes 
their payoff if they reject the offer from the shareholders and take their case to the DC (or, prior to 
the Big Bang, the local legal authority). The new parameter  captures the legal uncertainty experienced 
by creditors about their payoff. Note that it reduces their payoff only in the H state at time 2, in which 
the continuation value of the firm turns out to be high (i.e., sufficient to pay off creditors), and there 
is some probability ε that creditors cannot trigger CDS payments. Consequently, they receive a smaller 
payout, M, than the contracted notional of the CDS, N.11 In contrast, when the realization at time 2 
is in the L state, there is no such ambiguity regarding the nature of the trigger event, and the payoff is 
N.12 
4.2 Parameters 
The key parameters in the above setting, and in the hypothesis, are , q, , and S. We provide below a 
description of the economic intuition behind these parameters and the variables in our data set that 
best capture these effects. We then derive comparative statics for the sensitivity of the change in debt 
capacity (due to the introduction of a CDS contract) to changes in these parameters. The parameters 
are as follows: 
                                                 
a more clear-cut credit event and CDS should trigger, said David Benton, head of the derivatives practice at Allen & 
Overy.” 
11 The value of M could vary depending on the assumed bargaining power of creditors following their failure to trigger 
CDS payments. For example,  2
HM q C  if creditors are assumed to maintain the same bargaining power as they had in 
their initial round of debt negotiation with shareholders. Our results are robust as long as the bargaining power of creditors 
does not increase after their failure to trigger CDS payments, which seems a plausible assumption. We are grateful to Dmitry 
Chebotarev for raising this issue. 
12 Given the setup of the information asymmetry between the firm and its creditors, the creditors cannot distinguish the 
up-down path from the down-down path. All they can verify in the L state at time 2 is that the firm’s continuation value 
turns out to be low, and only after costly cash flow verification. This implies that for the given state-contingent legal risk 
parameter,  , a simple ex ante rescaling of the CDS notional amount in accordance with the anticipated degree of legal 
uncertainty in the recognition of the underlying trigger event cannot solve our problem. As noted earlier, corporate default 
is also highly idiosyncratic: its context varies significantly, case by case, and therefore it is not a straightforward exercise to 
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 Cash flow verifiability () 
Debt renegotiation is costly when property rights are poorly enforced (see, e.g., Bae and Goyal 
2009; Djankov, Hart, et al. 2008). Poor contract enforcement lowers the recovery rate and also 
increases the time spent in repossessing collateral during the restructuring process. These costs 
are captured by 1-, which is proportionately deducted from the continuation value, C2. As a 
consequence, , or contract enforceability, should be related to the strength of property rights 
in the firm’s local environment. As a proxy for this parameter, we follow the literature (Bae 
and Goyal 2009) and use the property rights variables Law & Order, Corruption, and Political 
Risk from the ICRG database. 
 Creditors’ bargaining power during private debt renegotiation (q) 
The bargaining power of creditors during the private renegotiation process—which is nega-
tively correlated with the fraction of equity owned by a firm’s principal shareholders, such as 
the CEO and institutional investors (see, e.g., Davydenko and Strebulaev 2007; Dahlquist et 
al. 2003)—determines the share of the continuation value, C2, available to creditors, with the 
balance going to shareholders. We use Closely Held Shares, the fraction of equity ownership held 
by controlling shareholders, obtained from Worldscope, as our proxy for concentration of 
shareholder ownership. 
 Trigger event uncertainty () 
A creditor-friendly local bankruptcy code implies less uncertainty in the recognition of the 
CDS trigger event, and therefore, a greater expected CDS payout (i.e., a higher ). For instance, 
when the local bankruptcy codes allow creditors to limit a firm’s ability to file for an in-court 
restructuring that it claims is voluntary, creditors clearly have stronger bargaining power and, 
in particular, the uncertainty related to triggering events in CDS contracts is reduced. This 
aspect of creditor rights is captured by one of the components of the creditor rights index first 
introduced into the finance literature by La Porta et al. (1998) (LLSV). Specifically, we source 
the LLSV variable “Restrictions on the shareholders to enter reorganization without creditors’ 
consent” from Djankov et al. (2007) and assume that when creditors can restrict entry into 
reorganization, legal uncertainty is reduced. 
 Liquidation value (S) 
The higher the liquidation value of the firm, or (equivalently) the lower the liquidation cost, 
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First from Djankov et al. (2007), another subindex of the overall creditor rights index of LLSV 
(1998), as a proxy for liquidation values. This creditor right establishes the priority of claimants 
(specifically, creditors) in payments resulting from liquidation of the firm. This is also con-
sistent with the evidence in Djankov, Hart, et al. (2008), which indicates that deviations from 
absolute priority rules are associated with substantially lower recovery rates. 
4.3 Debt pricing 
Our framework, which is based on the model of Bolton and Oehmke (2011), is essentially an extended 
binomial model that includes ex post trigger event uncertainty regarding the bankruptcy court’s actions. 
In our model, along the path where the first-period cash flow is 1
HC  and the continuation value turns 
out to be 2
LC  (the up-down path), there is by construction the possibility of strategic default by share-
holders in the first period. Specifically, shareholders can minimize the payment to creditors at time 1, 
min     2 2,(1 )
L LF C q C , by threatening liquidation without truthfully revealing the actual cash flow 
at time 1. The first term in the square brackets denotes the cost to shareholders if the firm truthfully 
reveals its time 1 cash flow ( 1
HC ) and pays F. The second term indicates the consequences of strategic 
default; in that case, the shareholders’ outlay is the sum of the verification cost of continuation value 
during private debt renegotiation ( 2(1 )
LC ) and the portion of the renegotiation surplus that share-
holders give up to the benefit of creditors ( 2
Lq C ). (Note that this formulation assumes that the veri-
fication costs are paid entirely out of the firm’s resources.) If honoring the original contract is not 
costly ( 2 2(1 )
L LF C q C    ), the firm does not attempt strategic default; otherwise, it does. 
Given this incentive compatibility condition of the shareholders, the firm’s debt capacity for 
a given F without CDS is 
   
     
 
    
   
   
  

     
     

















F q C F F F
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where the breakeven points for the debt F in the L and H states for the continuation value are given 
by    2 1 (1 )
L L
CF C q  and    2 1 (1 )
H H
CF C q , respectively.
13 Equation (1) presents the cash 
flows to the bondholders in two cases. If F is sufficiently low ( LCF F ), no strategic default occurs at 
the up-down node. When the debt burden becomes substantial (
L
CF F ), the firm finds it incentive 
compatible to deviate from the original debt contract and attempts to privately renegotiate its debt. In 
such a case, creditors can receive only 2
Lq C . Note that the possibility of strategic default limits the 
commitments that the firm can make. 
In the presence of CDSs, the payouts change. When creditors hold CDS contracts with a 
notional value of N, the payoff to the creditors in case of a credit event (π) is   N  if i = H at time 
2, and   N  if i = L. The firm honors the original debt contract without strategic default if 
max  2 , 0C  ≤ C2 – F. When   2q C , the creditors’ payout is higher when debt renegotiation 
occurs, and consequently the new debt proposal is not turned down by creditors. With these payouts, 
the firm’s debt capacity is 
   
     
     
       
       
 
             
2
2
1 ( , ) 1 if 
1 1 ( , ) 1 if 
H L
CDS H L H
C C
CF max N q C N F F
B
F N max N q C N F F F
     ,  (2) 
where     2 2 ,0
L L L
CF C max C N  and      2 2 ,,0
H H H
CF C max C N respectively. These breakeven points 
are defined in a manner similar to the case without CDSs. However, the existence of CDS contracts 
changes the alternative opportunities available to the creditors, since they may be able to obtain pay-
ment by triggering default and collecting on their CDS contracts. It should be noted that 
L L
C CF F  
when  2
LN q C and 
H H
C CF F  when   2
HN q C , that is, when the availability of CDS contracts 
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C
F F , strategic default would always arise even in the up-up state in our binomial 
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(taking into account the legal uncertainty regarding CDS trigger events) mitigates the firm’s limited-
commitment problem by strengthening the creditors’ bargaining power during private debt renegoti-
ations. 
The CDS notional can become excessive if there is substantial overinsurance of credit risk by 
creditors, resulting in an empty creditor problem. If  2
LN C , debt renegotiation between the firm 
and its CDS creditors fails in the L state at time 2 (as a result of the empty creditor problem), and the 
debt payoff becomes the liquidation value, S (< 2
LC ).14 The firm’s debt capacity with CDS in this 
case is 
   
     
     
       
       
 
             
2
2
1 ( , ) 1 if 








F max N q C S F F
B
F S max N q C S F F F
  , (3) 
where 2
i i
CF C  for i = L, H. Here, one may see an interstate trade-off in the debt payoff across the 
H and L states at time 2. Specifically, under the empty creditor problem, the debt payoff could be 
enhanced with little legal uncertainty in the H state, while it is reduced in the L state, particularly when 
liquidation is quite costly (i.e., S < 2
Lq C ). The empty creditor case includes the possibility of liquida-
tion due to the presence of excessive CDS holdings by creditors, who may be made better off by 
refusing to negotiate and instead triggering default, leading to liquidation.15 Creditors whose payments 
are secured, and who therefore are paid first in bankruptcy, are more inclined to do so. 
Proposition 1 presents the comparative statics of the model. Note that the first relation is 
novel to our framework, while the remaining three are related to parameters in Bolton and Oehmke 
(2011) and hence are implied by that model. 
Proposition 1. The introduction of CDS contracts on a firm’s debt increases its debt capacity 
                                                 
14 The condition 
2
H
N C  is implicitly imposed. Without this upper bound of N, renegotiation between the firm and 
creditors could always fail and the debt price degenerates to S, the liquidation value. We exclude this degenerate case from 
our analysis. 
15 Note that in this model the empty creditor problem is the result of individual creditors who have overinsured, that is, 
creditors who have purchased an “excessive” amount of CDSs so that they are better off if the firm defaults. Unfortunately, 
we do not have access to the data that reveal the identity of particular bondholders or CDS counterparties, so we cannot 
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Proof. See Appendix C.∎ 
When the enforcement of debt contracts faces significant limited-commitment problems due 
to a weak institutional environment (low , low q), well-functioning credit derivatives contracts, such 
as CDSs, can help firms overcome such institutional barriers. However, when the contingent payoff 
of the derivatives is affected by local legal regimes (low ), the effects of the CDS contract may be 
significantly limited. Moreover, when creditors overinsure their debt positions through CDS contracts, 
liquidation becomes more likely than successful private renegotiation. Under such circumstances, a 
higher liquidation value helps reduce the cost of debt capital that the firm must raise for its positive 
net present value investments. 
4.4 Empirical predictions 
Based on the insights from the extended Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model presented above, we 
derive the following formal hypothesis:16 
Hypothesis 1. The introduction of CDSs will increase debt capacity more for firms in countries with 
less legal uncertainty around triggering events; low liquidation cost; weak contract enforceability; and 
more concentrated shareholder ownership. 
5. Methodology 
The decision of whether to introduce CDSs to an individual firm headquartered in a particular country 
is endogenous and may be affected by characteristics of both the firm and the country. For instance, 
                                                 
16 Throughout the paper, we assume that firms’ actual leverage corresponds to their debt capacity B in the model, which 
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it may well be that CDS contracts are introduced on levered firms that are already distressed and are 
likely to face a higher probability of default. In addition, the introduction of such contracts may be 
affected by the stage of development of equity, debt, and derivatives markets; property rights; or 
bankruptcy codes in that country. If such endogeneity is not taken into account, estimates of the effect 
of CDS introduction could be biased, since the firms that have CDS introduced on them (i.e., the 
treated firms) or the countries in which CDS are introduced may differ on relevant dimensions from 
firms or countries that do not have CDS introductions. That is, measured differences in the outcomes 
of CDS introduction may be due to differences in firms’ or countries’ characteristics, or covariates, 
rather than to the introduction of the CDS themselves. 
Other studies have addressed this concern through the use of firm-specific instruments for 
CDS introduction. However, in an international sample, the standard instrumental variable regression 
approaches widely used in U.S. samples in the literature are unlikely to satisfy the exclusion restriction 
due to additional confounding factors at the country level. For example, instruments, such as banks’ 
use of foreign exchange derivatives, used in Saretto and Tookes (2013) may be correlated with the 
emergence of CDS markets in different countries and may therefore be related to features of the 
countries’ debt markets. Similarly, lenders’ capital ratios and portfolio concentration measures, which 
also have been used in the literature (see, e.g., Saretto and Tookes 2013; Subrahmanyam, Tang, and 
Wang 2014; Shan, Tang, and Yan 2016) can be confounded with banking regulations that may also 
affect the availability of CDSs to borrowers from the same country as the lenders. However, imposing 
restrictions on these lenders and borrowers by requiring that they reside in different countries results 
in a very significant (> 90%) reduction in sample size and a loss of power in our statistical tests. Such 
restrictions also introduce the possibility of selection biases associated with factors related to firms’ 
foreign financing opportunities.17 In addition to selection bias, imposing additional data availability 
restrictions will necessarily reduce variability in the legal, financial, and political environments that we 
consider, and as a consequence may reduce the precision of our estimates. 
We take endogeneity into account through our choice of empirical method. This method, 
propensity weighting, is relatively new and, to our knowledge, has not been used previously in the 
finance literature. This weighting was developed by Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky (2018), who term these 
                                                 
17 Other instruments, such as the geographical distance to New York (see, e.g., Shan, Tang, and Yan 2016), are not suitable 
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weights “overlap weights,” since the method creates a sample with the most overlap in covariates 
between the treated and nontreated groups. The intuition behind the method is fairly straightforward. 
We begin by estimating the probability that individual firms will experience a CDS introduction. This 
step is similar to the method used for propensity-score matching. However, matching may reduce 
sample size, particularly in settings with multiple sets of characteristics to take into account (e.g., firm 
and country characteristics). Propensity weighting, in contrast, uses every observation in the sample 
with a positive probability of being included in both the treated and control groups. 
Instead of matching, we use the estimated propensities to reweight observations in the sample 
in order to reduce differences in the characteristics of treated and nontreated firms. In effect, this 
method creates a synthetic sample for which the distribution of pretreatment variables, or covariates, 
is balanced across treated and nontreated firms. In this synthetic sample, there is no correlation be-
tween the treatment and the observed covariates. In addition, the size of the synthetic sample is typi-
cally much larger than that in the matching analysis, which is a particular advantage in our case as the 
number of firms that have CDS introduced on them is small in comparison to the total number of 
firms in the sample. 
Specifically, consider a sample of n firms. Each firm can belong to one of two groups, where 
Zit is the (binary) variable that indicates group membership in year t ; in our case, Zit = 1 represents the 
treatment, or the case in which a CDS is introduced on the firm. For each firm, we observe an outcome 
Yit and a k-dimensional set of covariates Xikt in each year t. The propensity score is the probability that 
we observe a CDS introduction, given the covariates: pit(xt) = Pr (Zit = 1|Xikt = xt). 
















p x for Z
x
 . (4) 
Note that this method weights each individual firm (treated or nontreated) by the probability 
that it will be assigned to the opposing group (nontreated or treated, respectively). Consider an individual 
firm that has a high estimated propensity for treatment and does, in fact, receive the treatment; this 
type of firm is relatively common, as it has covariate values that are comparable to those of other 
treated firms. Such a firm will be down-weighted to account for the commonness of its observation. 
In contrast, a treated firm with a low predicted probability of being treated will receive a higher weight. 
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the treatment will be up- (down-)weighted; the up-weighting allows the low-propensity treated firm 
to represent a larger group of similar firms that did not receive the treatment. Similarly, for nontreated 
firms, those with a high (low) probability of treatment will be up- (down-)weighted. This weighting of 
observations yields a synthetic sample of treated and nontreated firms with balanced covariates by 
construction.18 
The method proposed by Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky (2018) is related to inverse probability 
weighting, as described by Hirano and Imbens (2001). As the name suggests, inverse probability 
weighting uses the reciprocal of the estimated propensity for treatment to weight observations in the 
sample. However, inverse probability weighting has the drawback that when estimated probabilities 
are very small, weights can become extremely large and the resultant estimates become unstable. 
Rescaling of weights or arbitrary truncation/winsorization of extreme weights is typically used to ad-
dress this problem. In contrast, the overlap weights proposed by Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky (2018), 
which we use in this paper, are bounded between 0 and 1, do not require truncation, result in exact 
balance of the covariates, and, for plausible distributions of propensity weights, are associated with 
smaller standard errors in the estimates of treatment effects. Intuitively, the overlap weighting method 
results in a synthetic sample that can be interpreted as the set of firms that have a substantial proba-
bility both of having CDS introduced and of not having CDS contracts available. We estimate the 
effects of CDS introduction on this propensity-weighted sample. 
In Section 6.5, we analyze the robustness of our results along a number of additional dimen-
sions. These tests include a simulation-based analysis of the sensitivity of our main results to potential 
omitted variable biases (Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini 2008), and the use of additional controls in the 
propensity-weighting method. We also confirm the key conditional independence of our treatment 
assignment using alternative OLS estimations. In addition, we reestimate the effects of CDSs using 
                                                 
18 There are other methods of achieving balance in treated and nontreated samples prior to estimating treatment effects; 
these methods include the use of covariate balancing propensity scores (CBPS) (Imai and Ratkovic 2014) and the use of 
entropy balancing (see, e.g., Hainmueller 2012). The use of CBPS involves fitting the propensity-score model subject to 
the constraint of matching (potentially multiple) moments of the covariate distribution. This method can improve asymp-
totic efficiency at the expense of finite sample balance. In contrast, entropy balancing bypasses the estimation of the 
propensity score entirely and solves directly for the set of weights that create better balance in the moments of covariates 
by minimizing the distance between the synthetic sample and the original sample. Although each of these methods has the 
same goal, the overlap weighting method has the advantages that it yields the minimum variance of the treatment estimate 
among all balancing methods and gives more attention to the “overlap” population, that is, the group of “marginal” firms 
that have an approximately equal probability of experiencing and not experiencing CDS introduction. In our view, firms 
in this group are more exposed to a shift in policy regarding CDS availability, and it is these firms for which the effects of 
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CDS existence as the variable of interest, rather than CDS introduction; we also examine the robust-
ness of the results when we exclude the set of firms that may be considered “national champions,” 
since these firms may be perceived as having meaningfully different probabilities of default.19 Finally, 
we examine the sensitivity of our inferences to the exclusion of U.S. firms from the sample and analyze 
the longer-horizon effects of CDS introduction. 
6. Results 
6.1 CDS availability and introductions 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the sample by country and by industry. In panel A, we report 
the number of firms with available CDS by country and by year. Each year, on average, 1,225 firms 
have available CDSs. CDS availability is more common in developed countries: CDS on firms in the 
United States and Japan make up more than 62% of the sample. Other developed countries, such as 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Canada, also have a relatively high proportion of CDS 
firms. Note, however, that developed countries differ significantly with regards to the country char-
acteristics we consider. For example, the G7 countries span the entire spectrum of creditor rights, as 
defined in Djankov et al. (2007), from France (with the minimum creditor rights score of 0), to Japan 
(with a creditor rights score of 2) and the United Kingdom (with the maximum creditor rights score 
of 4). In addition to this variation in country characteristics among large, developed countries, in recent 
years the number of firms with available CDS has increased in smaller and/or less developed coun-
tries, such as India, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.20 The number of CDS introductions by coun-
try and year are reported in panel B. CDS introductions were relatively numerous prior to the financial 
crisis, with the number of introductions declining sharply after 2007. Importantly, note that the ma-
jority of CDS firms and introductions in our sample are in countries other than the United States, 
which has been the focus of prior CDS studies. 
                                                 
19 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
20 Note the absence of mainland Chinese firms from the sample. The raw data from Markit include 23 Chinese firms. Of 
these, 13 are classified as financial institutions, and 7 are government affiliates, which we exclude because of their potential 
for being bailed out. The remaining three nonfinancial, nongovernmental firms include two whose primary listing is in 
Hong Kong, which is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China. While these two firms meet the requirement that 
the primary trading location and operations be in the same country, we choose to exclude them from our sample. Because 
of Hong Kong’s SAR status, they are subject to different legal codes than are firms from nonautonomous regions of 
China. Finally, the remaining firm (China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation) is excluded because of a data error in the 
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Table 1, panel C, reports the number of firms in each industry that have CDS available by 
year, using the Fama-French 48-industry groupings. We see significant variation in the patterns of 
CDS availability across industries. Broadly speaking, industries associated with relatively high levels of 
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (utilities, communication, transportation, oil and gas, and 
chemicals) appear more likely to have CDS based on their debt, while industries associated with ser-
vices (fabricated products, personal services), commodities (agriculture, coal, and precious metals), 
and government (private defense companies) tend to have lower levels of CDS availability.21 
6.2 Firm characteristics, country characteristics, and CDS introduction 
The variation in CDS availability across sectors, observed in panel C of Table 1, suggests that there 
are systematic differences between firms on which CDS have been introduced. In addition, the evi-
dence reported in panels A and B of Table 1 suggests that differences in country characteristics may 
also influence CDS introduction. We therefore estimate the propensity of CDS introduction allowing 
for both firm- and country-specific characteristics. The specific metrics of firm characteristics that we 
consider include measures related to size (total assets measured in USD), profitability (Tobin’s q, mar-
ket-to-book equity ratio, return on assets, gross profit margin), cash flow (dividend, cash flow to sales, 
free cash flow to total assets), investment (cash and short-term investments, ratios of capital expendi-
ture and R&D to assets, and net PP&E to size), and capital structure (market leverage at the firm and 
industry levels, ratio of convertible debt to size, debt maturity). We also include a firm’s age and the 
estimate of its tax rate. To measure the concentration of equity ownership, we use the percentage of 
closely held shares (Closely Held Shares), defined as the percentage of shares held by insiders. 
Country characteristics include four categories of the local legal and financial environment: 
creditor rights, property rights, the availability of private credit, and financial market sophistication. 
To measure the strength of creditor rights, we use variables constructed by Djankov et al. (2007) 
following La Porta et al. (1998), whose Creditor Rights index is the sum of four individual variables. 
Each of the creditor rights characteristics (Restrictions on Entry, No Automatic Stay, Management Does Not 
Stay, and Secured Creditors First) is measured as an indicator variable, with a value of one indicating 
stronger creditor rights.22 
                                                 
21 The number of firms with available CDSs is small relative to the full sample. As a consequence, matching techniques 
would have the disadvantage that significant portions of the overall sample would be excluded from the analysis. 
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As mentioned above, for measures of property rights, we use three variables from the ICRG 
developed by the PRS Group: Law & Order, Corruption, and Political Risk. For each of these indexes, 
higher scores indicate better ratings (i.e., a better legal environment, less corruption, lower political 
risk) and thus better property rights. 
The strength of the private credit market is measured by domestic credit extended by financial 
corporations to the private sector scaled by GDP (Domestic Credit to Private Sector), and by total credit 
to the private nonfinancial sector scaled by GDP (Private Credit), obtained from the World Develop-
ment Indicators database of the World Bank and BIS’s Total Credit Statistics, respectively. The so-
phistication of the local securities market is measured by the ratios of the market capitalization of CDS 
firms to that of all firms in a country (CDS Market); the stock market capitalization to GDP (Stock 
Market); and the market capitalization of the private bond market to GDP (Private Bond Market). 
We estimate logit regressions in which the dependent variable is equal to one if CDS are in-
troduced on an individual firm in a particular year, and zero otherwise.23 In all our regressions, we use 
year and industry fixed effects, with industries defined using the Fama-French 48-industry classifica-
tions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year 
to allow for errors in the measurement of the date of introduction of CDS trading. We standardize 
ownership concentration and country variables for comparability. 
Table 2 reports results from the logit regressions; for expositional purposes, we report coeffi-
cients from regressions with single regressors. Coefficients on the aggregate Creditor Rights index, as 
well as three of the four components of Creditor Rights, are negative and statistically significant. Specif-
ically, we see coefficients of –0.129 (t-statistic = –3.1) on the Creditor Rights index, and coefficients of 
–0.129 (t-statistic = –2.7), –0.310 (t-statistic = –6.1) and –0.129 (t-statistic = –2.6) on Restrictions on 
Entry, No Automatic Stay, and Management Does Not Stay, respectively. These results indicate that CDS 
are less (more) likely to be introduced on firms that operate in countries with strong (weak) creditor 
rights. The exception to this is the case in which secured creditors receive priority in payments from 
                                                 
23 Given that these regressions include both CDS and non-CDS observations, the total number of firm-year observations 
of 80,822 in the logit regression in Table 2 (and the subsequent analyses) is much larger than the number of 1,421 CDS 
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the proceeds of liquidation (Secured Creditor First). For that variable, the coefficient is statistically sig-
nificant and positive, indicating that CDS introductions are more likely in environments that feature 
priority protection for creditors in the event of liquidation. 
Property rights variables have no significant effect on the propensity to introduce CDSs. In 
contrast, if the domestic credit market scaled by GDP is robust, CDS are more likely to be introduced 
(coefficient on Domestic Credit to Private Sector = 0.329, t-statistic = 5.3). This is consistent with CDS 
providing hedging benefits to domestic creditors, where that credit is a significant source of financing 
for firms. CDS are also more likely to be introduced in countries with a developed CDS market, stock 
market, and private bond market (coefficients of 0.450, 0.118, and 0.276, respectively). Finally, CDS 
are less (more) likely to be introduced in firms where ownership concentration is high (low); the co-
efficient on Closely Held Shares is negative and statistically significant (coefficient = –0.259, t-statistic = 
–6.3). This may indicate a stronger interest in CDS protection in circumstances in which a more dis-
persed ownership base might be expected to engage in relatively little monitoring. 
More generally, these results indicate substantial differences in the characteristics of firms that 
experience CDS introduction compared to those that do not. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for 
the subsamples of firms that do, and do not, experience CDS introduction during our sample period. 
In addition to reporting the sample means and standard errors, we report statistical tests for differ-
ences between these two subsamples, including t-tests for differences in the means and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests for differences in the distributions of the characteristics. We also report a measure of 
bias between the two subsamples, calculated as in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
The results clearly indicate systematic differences in both firm and country characteristics for 
the sample of firms with CDS introductions. The differences in average characteristics are generally 
highly statistically significant. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for differences in the two distributions 
are also highly significant in all but one country characteristic (the distribution of Secured Creditor First). 
Moreover, the majority of the bias measures indicate that the differences between firm and country 
characteristics across the two subsamples are also economically significant. 
Combined, the results in Tables 2 and 3 reinforce the case that firms with CDS are different 
along many dimensions from those without them. In fact, it is virtually impossible to find firms with 
and firms without CDS that are closely matched across all dimensions. As a consequence, in estimating 
the effects of CDS introduction, we must control for these differences in covariates. In the next sec-
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overlap weights that we use to balance covariates across the subsamples and thus correct for these 
differences in estimating the effects of CDS introduction. 
6.3 Overlap weight calculation 
To calculate overlap weights as described in Section 5, we estimate logit regressions, using an indicator 
variable for CDS introduction as the dependent variable. That is, we estimate the propensity that a 
firm i experiences a CDS introduction in year t. As explanatory variables, we employ all firm and 
country characteristics in Table 2 (discussed in the previous section) jointly, as well as industry and 
year fixed effects. Wooldridge (2002), Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky (2018), and Curtis, Hammill, and 
Eisenstein (2007) point out that in estimating the propensity model, parsimony is not a consideration, 
since the model is not used to draw inferences but only to balance the covariates in the two subsam-
ples. 
We use the selection model to estimate the probability of CDS introduction, pit(x), and then 
weight each observation by wit. This overlap weighting method balances the covariates in the two 
subsamples. Figure 1 illustrates the effect for selected covariates. In each panel, we present (in the left 
charts) the distribution of the covariate in the treated and control samples prior to overlap weighting 
and (in the right charts) the distribution of the covariate in the treated and control samples following 
the application of overlap weights. It is clear that the weighting method balances the covariates be-
tween the subsamples of firms with and firms without CDS introductions. In Table E2 in Appendix 
E, we present additional descriptive statistics of the two subsamples after overlap weighting. By con-
struction, the overlap weights produce an exact balance in the means of the treated and control groups, 
although there are some differences in the (reweighted) densities of the samples of treated and control 
firms (i.e., the overlap weighting methodology does not match the densities of the treated and control 
subsamples at every point). However, as Figure 1 shows, while the overlap weighting procedure does 
not consider moments beyond the mean, the empirical density functions match relatively well even 
for covariates with the largest deviations in density—and markedly better than in the unweighted 
sample. 
Using the overlap weighting method, we create a synthetic sample and then use this propen-
sity-weighted sample to estimate how CDS introduction affects firms. The outcomes that we examine 
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6.4 CDS and corporate capital structure 
An important aspect of our analysis is that we examine both the effect of CDS introduction on real 
decisions and whether the local legal and economic environment moderates that effect. In panel B of 
Table E1 in Appendix E, we report correlations between the local country variables used in our anal-
ysis. Not surprisingly, many of these correlations are quite strong. For example, the correlations be-
tween property rights variables (Political Risk, Corruption, and Law & Order) are all strongly positive. 
These correlations are not a concern when estimating propensity weights; however, in measuring treat-
ment effects, collinearity in these variables makes inferences more difficult. As a consequence, in es-
timating treatment effects, we estimate the effects of individual conditioning variables related to cred-
itor rights, property rights, and equity ownership concentration, and the interaction effects of these 
variables with CDS introduction in separate regressions. 
In Table 4, we analyze the effects of CDS introduction on firms’ leverage from panel estima-
tions. In the baseline regression specification reported in column 1, CDS introduction is associated 
with a positive and significant increase in leverage. The magnitude of the coefficient (0.0123, t-statistic 
= 2.20) is economically significant. Since the average firm leverage observed in our sample is 0.18, this 
coefficient indicates an approximate 6.8% increase in leverage associated with CDS introduction. 
Moreover, the coefficient on CDS introduction is positive and significant in every specification that 
we consider in Table 4.24 
Note that in some circumstances, increases in the amount of debt may not map into increases 
in the leverage ratio if the value of equity changes sufficiently. As a consequence, to better interpret 
the impact of CDS on leverage, in untabulated analysis we examine the relation between CDS intro-
ductions and the value of total assets in our sample. We find a positive but statistically insignificant 
change in the market value of a firm’s assets after CDS introduction; specifically, the coefficient esti-
mate of CDS introduction on (log) market value is 0.0077, with a standard error of 0.03. This evidence 
                                                 
24 Based on the point estimate of the effect of CDS introduction on the leverage ratio of 1.23%, one can perform a “back-
of-the-envelope” calculation to judge the implied effect of CDS introduction on aggregate corporate financing in our 
sample. The average ratio of market value of assets to GDP in our sample, where the market value of assets is the sum of 
stock market capitalization and all private credit, is 255% (see table E-1 in appendix E). Multiplying this by 1.23% implies 
an impact of CDS introduction on the corporate-debt-to-GDP ratio in our sample of 3.14%. This is an economically 
significant effect, and a significant portion of the estimated effect of an increase in the creditor rights index on the debt-
to-GDP ratio of approximately 6% in Djankov et al. (2007). If we use a more restrictive measure of corporate debt that 
excludes trade credit, the implied impact of CDS introduction on the corporate-debt-to-GDP ratio is smaller, at 1.95%, 
but still economically large. Both of these estimates are consistent with CDSs playing a significant role in the capital 
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is consistent with that reported in Danis and Gamba (2018), and suggests that our results are driven 
by the numerator effect, that is, increases in debt rather than changes in total asset value. 
Our study is the first to explore the unconditional relation between CDS introductions and 
leverage internationally. While our sample includes U.S. firms, which have been the focus of prior 
work, these account for only 20% of firms and 40% of CDS introductions in our international sample. 
Our international results are broadly consistent with the findings of Saretto and Tookes (2013) and 
Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) in the North American context: Saretto and Tookes (2013) 
show that U.S. firms with traded CDS contracts on their debt are able to maintain higher leverage 
ratios and have higher credit risk. 
In Table 4, we also see evidence consistent with Proposition 1 that, following CDS introduc-
tion, firms in countries with stronger creditor rights along two dimensions have significantly higher 
increases in leverage. Specifically, coefficients on the interactions of CDS introduction and both Re-
strictions on Entry and Secured Creditors First are positive and statistically significant. We consider each of 
these in turn. The significant effect of restrictions on entry into reorganization is consistent with the 
implications of the model. Note that the firms’ entry into reorganization can serve as a credit event 
and consequently trigger payments due under CDS obligations. In the context of the model, creditors 
who have access to CDS protection in legal environments that give them control over entry into 
reorganization have substantially higher bargaining power. This bargaining power allows the firm to 
overcome a limited-commitment problem in the issuance of debt, and consequently the firm is able 
to sustain more leverage. This result is particularly interesting in light of differences in events that 
trigger CDS in North America versus other regions in the world. That is, since the Big Bang Protocol 
in 2009, in North America reorganizations are not included in the list of credit events that trigger CDS 
payments, while they can trigger such payments in regions other than North America.25 
The second dimension of creditor rights that is associated with a significant positive coefficient 
on leverage following CDS introduction is Secured Creditor First. This result is consistent with the 
model’s implication regarding liquidation cost. Specifically, the results of the model predict that the 
impact of CDSs on debt will be larger where liquidation costs are lower (or liquidation values are 
higher), particularly when empty creditors could force the reference entities into liquidation rather 
                                                 
25 The inclusion of CDS introductions where restructuring is excluded as a credit event should bias our results against 
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than restructuring. In cases in which the bankruptcy code specifies the priority of payout, the bargain-
ing position of creditors should be stronger and the loss of value related to liquidation should be 
smaller (see, e.g., Davydenko and Franks 2008). 
In contrast to the significant coefficients on Restrictions on Entry and Secured Creditors First, we 
find no significant effects on leverage for the interaction of CDS introduction and either No Automatic 
Stay or Management Does Not Stay. That is, while the availability of CDSs appears to influence capital 
structure through effects on entry into and exit from the reorganization process, CDSs do not appear 
to affect leverage through differences in creditors’ rights that bind during the reorganization process. 
Put simply, in terms of the effects of CDS introduction on leverage, not all creditor rights are alike. 
We find evidence that the availability of CDSs increases leverage in countries with weaker 
property rights: the coefficients on Law & Order and Political Risk are negative and highly significant. 
This evidence is consistent with the model’s prediction that leverage increases more strongly in coun-
tries with weak contract enforceability. In other words, CDS provide a substitute for weak property 
rights. Intuitively, these contracts may act as a firm-specific liberalization mechanism, facilitating an 
increase in credit in countries where poor enforceability of property rights acts as a constraint on the 
supply of credit. This interpretation is also consistent with the arguments in Bae and Goyal (2009) 
that, along with creditor rights, property rights are an important determinant of the credit that is avail-
able to firms. Indeed, across regressions, Political Risk is the conditioning variable that is economically 
most important in influencing the relation between leverage and CDS introductions.26 
Finally, we observe a positive and significant coefficient on Closely Held Shares. This result is 
consistent with the implications of the model: it suggests that the increase in leverage is larger for 
                                                 
26 We use data on property rights from the ICRG rather than debt enforcement measures from Djankov, Hart, et al. 
(2008), as the ICRG measures vary through time. However, in robustness checks, we examine whether a subset of the 
cross-sectional measures taken from Djankov, Hart, et al. (2008), when incorporated into our tests, yield similar inferences. 
Specifically, we use their measures of Time (duration to resolution of insolvency), Time to Payment (duration to secured 
creditor payout), Cost (cost of debt enforcement proceeding), and Efficiency (present value of the terminal value of the firm 
after bankruptcy costs) as conditioning variables in our regressions. The prediction from our model is that higher values 
of Time, Time to Payment, and Cost and lower values of Efficiency, representing higher costs of debt enforcement, are associ-
ated with larger increases in debt following CDS introduction. The coefficients for the interaction terms of CDS introduc-
tion with Time, Time to Payment, and Cost are all positive, and for two of these variables (Time and Time to Payment), the 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for the interaction term of CDS introduction with 
Efficiency is negative and significant at the 10% level. Overall, these results are consistent with the prediction that in envi-
ronments with poor enforcement of property rights or low verifiability of cash flows, the increase in debt associated with 
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firms that have newly introduced CDS in cases in which equity ownership is concentrated and where 
creditors’ bargaining power is weaker. 
Overall, our results provide additional evidence that the legal environment faced by the firm 
is an important determinant of capital structure, which is consistent with our theoretical framework. 
Specifically, our results indicate that while the introduction of CDS contracts is associated with higher 
leverage, this effect is significantly larger when the legal environment provides creditors with greater 
certainty about their ability to use their (stronger) creditor rights (high , proxied by creditors’ ability 
to restrict entry into reorganization); with weaker ability to enforce contracts (low , proxied by weak 
property rights); with higher priority in the event of liquidation (high S, proxied by the payment of 
liquidation proceeds to secured creditors first); and with weaker initial bargaining power relative to 
shareholders (low q, proxied by the extent to which the firm is closely held). Our results indicate that 
while CDS may allow firms to mitigate a weak institutional heritage, residual uncertainty about the 
local legal environment—legal risk, as opposed to credit risk—can influence their effect. 
Given that the results in Table 4 suggest that the availability of CDSs affects firms’ financing 
choices, a natural question is whether changes in capital structure are also associated with changes in 
investment and whether any effects on investment vary with the local legal environment. For example, 
if CDS contracts allow for better risk sharing, as well as strengthen creditors’ bargaining power, then 
their effect on investment should be larger in countries where shareholders have strong bargaining 
power and in countries with weaker enforceability of law. In contrast to the work on the effects of 
CDSs on financing, the literature on the effects of CDSs on other real activity inside the firm is rela-
tively modest. In a recent paper, Narayanan and Uzmanoglu (2018) find that for firms in the United 
States, the initiation of CDS trading, but not CDS notional amounts outstanding or liquidity, has a 
significant negative effect on investments (defined as the sum of R&D expenditure, capital expendi-
ture, and acquisition expenditure less the sale of PP&E). 
We briefly explore the association between CDS introduction and capital investment; these 
results are reported in Table E3 in Appendix E. In the baseline regression, which looks at the average 
treatment effect across all countries, we find no evidence that the introduction of CDSs has a signifi-
cant effect. However, some evidence indicates that the effect of CDSs on capital investment is positive 
in countries with stronger creditor rights. This evidence appears to be driven by a positive effect in 
countries with restrictions on entry to reorganization. In particular, the coefficient on Restrictions on 
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to be positive and significant. This suggests that the increase in leverage is financing at least some 
incremental capital investment. 
6.5 Robustness tests  
We carry out several further tests to document the robustness of our results. These include a test for 
sensitivity to omitted variables; the use of additional controls in the propensity-weighting method; the 
reestimation of our results using OLS; the reestimation of a sample that excludes U.S. firms; the rees-
timation of subsamples without firms that may be considered “national champions”; the reestimation 
of the results using CDS existence rather than CDS introduction as the variable of interest; and an 
analysis of longer-horizon effects of CDS introduction. Finally, we briefly examine the effects of the 
“Bang protocols” on our results. 
6.5.1 Omitted variable test. 
Similar to other techniques that use propensity scores to match or weight observations, overlap 
weighting is based on a set of observed covariates and thus, in principle, is subject to possible omitted 
variable biases. Therefore, we analyze whether our results are sensitive to the possibility of unobserved 
confounding variables, adapting a methodology proposed by Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2008). 
The approach includes simulated unobserved covariates in the logit model that estimates the propen-
sity of CDS introduction. Subsequently, the resultant confounded weights are incorporated into the 
outcome regressions using the same regression specifications as in our main analyses. This analysis 
allows us to assess the sensitivity of the estimates of interest to simulated unobserved confounders 
that affect both the treatment selection and the outcome variable, since such a confounder would bias 
the estimated treatment effect.27 
Specifically, following Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2008), we use two alternative methods 
to simulate confounders. In the first method, we estimate the effect of “calibrated confounders,” 
which are specified to have an empirical distribution similar to the existing, observable covariates in 
the logit regression. Since calibrated confounders are constrained to be binary variables, we use binary 
transformations of continuous covariates (indicating whether an observation is above or below the 
median of that variable). Because the results using calibrated confounders might be driven by the 
                                                 
27 Other techniques, such as those of Rosenbaum (1987), assess the sensitivity of significance levels and confidence inter-
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particular behavior of the chosen covariates, in the second method we test whether “killer confound-
ers” exist that could drive the estimated treatment effect to zero (Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini 2008). 
The relation of killer confounders to treatment selection and outcome variables is not constrained to 
be similar to the relations of existing covariates to these variables. As a consequence, the influence of 
killer confounders on estimates is more extreme, and inferences regarding their effect are more con-
servative. These techniques allow us to use different assumptions about the distribution of confound-
ing factors to assess the robustness of the average treatment effect and test whether there exists a 
plausible set of confounders that eliminates the estimated treatment effect. Further details on the 
methodology are provided in Appendix B. 
Table 5 reports the results from sensitivity analyses conducted to assess the effect of potential 
omitted variable bias on the results in Table 4. For each regression specification, we simulate 100 
iterations of calibrated and killer confounders, and for each iteration we reestimate the effect of CDS 
introductions and their interactions with conditioning variables using regression specifications identi-
cal to those in Table 4 but using the confounded balancing weights. We report the minimum and 
maximum coefficient for the interaction variables across simulations of alternative calibrated and killer 
confounders. The reported minimum/maximum values are the most extreme confounding effects 
across all simulations and thus represent the most conservative inferences; all other simulations yield 
values within these bounds. 
The results indicate that our primary results are relatively insensitive to unobserved confound-
ers. Comparison of the regression coefficients on the interaction of CDS introduction and alternative 
conditioning variables in Table 4 with the results for calibrated confounders shows that the minimum 
and maximum coefficients in Table 5 always have the same sign and significance levels as the corre-
sponding estimated coefficients in the observed data, except for the minimum coefficient on Re-
strictions on Entry, which is slightly smaller than the estimated coefficient in Table 4 and is only weakly 
significant. This evidence indicates that for calibrated confounders, even when the outcome and the 
selection effect of an unobserved confounder is strong, inferences regarding the treatment effect are 
not overturned. 
Killer confounders tend to result in a wider range of regression coefficients, but even here we 
observe that the direction and strength of the relations are similar to those in Table 4, indicating that 
the outcome and selection effects need to be very strong in order to “kill” the treatment effect. For 
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on Entry. The minimum coefficient across 100 iterations is approximately 20% smaller than that of the 
coefficient estimated in Table 4 (0.0100 vs. 0.0128), and while the estimate in Table 4 is significant at 
the 5% level, the minimum estimate when killer confounders are added to the propensity model is not 
statistically significant. For Secured Creditors First, the smallest coefficient with killer confounders is 
significant at the 10% level, while it is significant at the 5% level in the main results. The inferences 
on the other variables remain largely unchanged. Note that even in those cases in which the bounds 
of the sensitivity analysis indicate that an omitted variable has the potential to overturn inferences, 
these results do not provide evidence that such an omitted variable exists; rather, they represent an 
estimate of how our primary results might change if extreme values of such confounders were to exist. 
Overall, the results of the sensitivity test in Table 5 indicate that our primary results regarding the 
effect of CDS introduction on leverage are relatively insensitive to unobserved confounders. 
6.5.2 Additional controls. 
In Table E4 in Appendix E, we estimate the regressions in Table 4 including lagged firm characteristics 
as additional controls. These firm characteristics are Debt Maturity, Market/Book, PPE/Size, Cash 
Flow/Sales, Cash and Short-term Investments/Total Assets (log), Total Assets in USD (log), ROA Volatility (log), 
Tax Rate, and Leverage Market Value (Industry Median). The inclusion of the additional controls has no 
effect on the sample size. Overall, the economic magnitudes and statistical significance of the effects 
of CDS introduction are preserved, although the interaction term of CDS Introduction with Secured Cred-
itors First loses significance. While many of these firm characteristics are inputs into the overlap 
weights, we do not observe that the inclusion of these characteristics makes the estimation of differ-
ences in outcome variables more efficient. 
6.5.3 OLS estimation. 
Bun and Harrison (2014) show that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of the coefficient of 
the interaction term between an endogenous regressor and an exogenous covariate is consistent, and 
asymptotically normally distributed, under typical conditions.28 In our setting, the main variable of 
                                                 
28 These conditions are generally satisfied for higher-order dependence between endogenous and exogenous regressors, 
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interest is the interaction between endogenous (CDS introduction) and exogenous (legal and institu-
tional characteristics) regressors.29 In Table E5 in Appendix E, we present results analogous to those 
in Table 4 using OLS, that is, without applying the overlap weights. The sample for the OLS estimation 
is substantially larger than that in the main tables, since we do not require the joint availability of all 
lagged firm and country characteristics needed to estimate the overlap weights. Nevertheless, the point 
estimates of our main interaction terms are similar in terms of signs and significance levels to those in 
the main tables. The main changes are that the interaction effect with the Corruption variable becomes 
significant, while Secured Creditors First is now negative and weakly significant. 
6.5.4 Exclusion of U.S. firms. 
The evidence in Table 1 indicates that approximately 40% of the CDS introductions in our sample are 
for U.S. reference entities, for which restructuring has been excluded as a trigger event since the 2009 
Big Bang Protocol.30 To highlight the truly global aspects of our main results, as well as to confirm 
that no-restructuring (XR) CDS contracts are not driving our main findings, we reestimate our tests 
excluding U.S. firms from the sample.31 Although removing U.S. firms reduces the overall sample size, 
we are still left with more than 800 CDS introductions and a substantial amount of cross-sectional 
variation in the sample. We find that the results in the ex-U.S. sample are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 4, with the sign and significance of the variables of interest comparable to those 
reported in our main tests. Table E6 in Appendix E reports these results. 
6.5.5 Countries with few CDS introductions. 
Firms with CDS introductions in countries with very few CDS firms could be large natural monopolies 
(e.g., electric grids, pipelines, rail systems) and/or large firms that are fully controlled either by the 
government or with large government ownership stakes. Such CDS firms may be more likely to be 
bailed out because they are in strategically important industries, bring substantial revenues to the 
budget from exports and resource exploration concessions, or generally employ large numbers of 
people. To assess whether such large “national champions” have an important effect on our results, 
                                                 
29 For similar implications of the econometrics, see also Annan and Schlenker (2015), among many others. It is also worth 
noting that the creditor rights variables of our sample countries do not change over time and take values that are prede-
termined prior to the beginning of our sample period. 
30 As a result, no-restructuring (“XR”) CDS contracts form the majority of the U.S. single-name corporate CDS contracts 
in the post-Big-Bang period. 
31 Canadian single-name corporate CDS are also XR CDS contracts in the post-Big-Bang time period. The exclusion of 
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we estimate our panel regressions excluding countries with relatively few CDS introductions, consid-
ering alternative thresholds of 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, and 32 CDS firms in a country. Note that as 
the threshold for the number of CDS introductions increases, we remove from the sample entire 
countries in which only a few CDS firms exist. Despite the resultant decreases in sample size and 
cross-section, we find in untabulated results that the effects of CDS introductions are robust to smaller 
samples that exclude large national champions. 
6.5.6 CDS introduction versus CDS existence. 
As part of the identification strategy, our tests are focused on the introduction of CDSs rather than 
CDS existence. That is, we distinguish between firm-years in which sample firms had no CDS traded 
on them and those firm-years in which CDS were first traded on sample firms. This method is similar 
to the difference-in-differences approach in Saretto and Tookes (2013) that focuses on the years be-
fore/after CDS introduction. In contrast, other studies often refer to CDS introduction but actually 
study CDS existence by simply measuring whether or not a firm has CDS traded on it in a particular 
year. We investigate whether our (untabulated) results are sensitive to defining our CDS variable as 
CDS existence as opposed to CDS introduction, and we find that our main results are robust to this 
alternative approach. 
6.5.7 Long-horizon effects. 
We also consider whether the effect of CDS introductions occurs over a longer horizon, so that a 
change in leverage would only be observed in later periods. To this end, we estimate the outcome 
regressions using separate variables for CDS availability in years 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 or more years, as well 
as the interaction effects of these variables with the conditioning variables. Our untabulated results 
show a large, economically and statistically significant effect of CDS availability on leverage in year 1. 
The size of the coefficient monotonically declines for later periods, with coefficients in years 2 and 3 
still statistically significant. Significance for the interaction effects of conditioning variables and CDS 
availability tends to be concentrated in the immediate next period (i.e., year 1). However, some inter-
action effects, such as with Restrictions on Entry, are significant also in later periods. Interactions with 
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6.5.8 Regulatory changes.  
One of the purposes of the Big Bang and subsequent Small Bang protocols was to reduce legal uncer-
tainty in the CDS market regarding whether a firm’s action could be considered a credit event.32 If the 
protocols achieved this purpose, then the importance of our proxy for , or Restrictions on Entry, should 
decrease after the Bang protocols are introduced. In addition, this effect should be most cleanly iden-
tified in firms outside of North America, since the protocols exclude restructuring as a credit event 
for North American firms, but still include it as a credit event for firms in other regions.33 Therefore, 
any reduction in legal uncertainty associated with the Bangs would be more cleanly observed for firms 
outside North America. To estimate this effect, we create a post-Bang dummy with a value equal to 1 
for years after 2008 (and zero otherwise). If the protocols are successful in reducing legal uncertainty, 
then we would expect the coefficient on the interaction effect of CDS introduction and restrictions 
on entry to be reduced (or, equivalently, we would expect the triple interaction coefficient to be neg-
ative). Furthermore, this effect should be stronger when North American firms are excluded. 
The results of our reestimated regression, reported in Table E7 in Appendix E, are consistent 
with our conjecture: we find that the coefficient on the triple interaction of CDS Introduction x Re-
strictions on Entry x Post-Bang Dummy in this sample is significantly negative, consistent with the views 
that (1) the Bang protocols reduced legal uncertainty, and (2) Restrictions on Entry is a proxy for legal 
uncertainty. At the same time, the unconditional CDS introduction effect becomes more significant 
in the post-Bang period. 
7. Conclusion 
We analyze the impact of CDS introduction on real decision-making within the firm, taking into con-
sideration features of the local economic and legal environments of firms. We extend the model of 
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) to incorporate uncertainty regarding whether actions taken by the refer-
ence entity will trigger CDS obligations. Our model provides structure to our analysis and generates 
                                                 
32 The Big Bang Protocol was implemented on April 8, 2009.  The subsequent Small Bang Protocols were implemented 
in stages later that year, with changes in conventions (such as fixed coupons) occurring in June of 2009 and changes in 
contract (such as restructuring clause changes) occurring in July. The Small Bang extended some of the Big Bang protocols 
to European CDS; in particular, the Small Bang addressed restructuring as a credit event. See, for example, Gündüz et al. 
(2020). Note that since we use annual data in our analysis, the changes associated with both Big and Small Bangs are treated 
as a single event. 
33 Note that “restructuring” in North American firms in this context does not refer to Chapter 11 filings; these are auto-
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empirical predictions that we test in a sample of more than 56,000 firms across 51 countries over the 
period 2001–2015. 
Using a novel overlap-weighting method to control for endogenous differences in the samples 
of firms with and without CDS introductions, we find that after CDS introduction, the affected firms 
increase leverage in countries with stronger creditor rights along specific dimensions. The first dimen-
sion is the case in which creditor consent is required to enter reorganization. This is consistent with 
the predictions of the model: creditors with CDS protection and control over entry into reorganization 
have substantially higher bargaining power. Indeed, as noted in Bolton and Oehmke (2011), it is pre-
cisely in the setting of private renegotiation where CDS protection increases the bargaining power of 
creditors. The greater bargaining power of creditors mitigates the limited-commitment problem faced 
by the firm and allows for higher levels of leverage. The second dimension is the case in which the 
bankruptcy code requires that secured creditors be paid first out of liquidation proceeds. This is con-
sistent with the model’s prediction that leverage increases more strongly with the introduction of 
CDSs (and the concomitant enhancement of creditor rights) if liquidation costs are low. Finally, we 
find that CDS introduction increases leverage more strongly in countries with weaker contract en-
forceability and in firms where equity ownership is more concentrated. 
In robustness checks, we find that the effects of CDSs on leverage, and the influence of the 
local legal and market environments on those effects, continue to hold in the sample when U.S. firms 
are excluded, when firms that might be “national champions” are excluded, when additional controls 
are included in the analysis, when longer-horizon effects on the outcome variable are allowed, when 
CDS existence (rather than CDS introduction) is considered, and when simulated omitted variables 
are considered. We also examine whether the Big and Small Bang protocols, introduced in 2009 as a 
means of reducing legal uncertainty, are associated with a decline in the influence of our proxy for 
legal uncertainty; we find that they are. 
In complementary tests, we find some evidence that the interaction between CDS introduction 
and local bankruptcy codes influences the investment policies of the firm. Specifically, in cases with 
creditor restrictions on firms entering reorganization—the circumstance in which leverage increases—
the presence of CDS increases the level of capital investment by the firm. 
Overall, we find substantial evidence that the introduction of CDSs affects real decisions of 
nonfinancial firms, including choices regarding leverage and investment. These results are consistent 
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have an economically meaningful effect on aggregate corporate financing. Importantly, we also find 
that the legal and market environments in which the reference entity operates influence the impact of 
CDSs. The effect of CDS is larger in countries in which uncertainty about firms’ CDS obligations is 
reduced and in which CDS mitigate weak property rights. These results highlight the incomplete na-
ture of CDS contracts in global capital markets, a feature the burgeoning academic literature on credit 
derivatives has largely overlooked. Given the IDSA’s recent wave of credit event definition changes 
aimed at alleviating legal uncertainty in CDS contracts, the measurement of the extent to which such 
contractual remedies can effectively restore the hedging efficacy of the global credit derivatives market 
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Figure 1. Covariate balancing of sample firms 
This figure shows the covariate balancing of sample firms a year prior to CDS introduction by plotting the distributions 
for treated firms (i.e., firms in the year of CDS introduction) and control firms (i.e., firms without CDS introductions in 
that year) before and after imposing overlap weights. Panel A shows results for selected firm characteristics; panel B shows 
results for selected country characteristics. Variables are selected based on the largest EADD in Table E2 in Appendix E. 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 countries over the period 
2001–2015. Market data are from Datastream; accounting data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. 
Appendix D defines all variables. 
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Figure 1. Covariate balancing of sample firms (continued) 










/rfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhab092/6357050 by guest on 31 August 2021
43 
Table 1. International CDS introductions and availability 
The table shows the number of CDS reference entities by year across countries (panel A) and industries (panel C) and the 
number of CDS introductions by year across countries (panel B). Countries in panels A and B are sorted by the creditor 
rights index as reported in the last column of panel A. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 
nonfinancial firms across 51 countries over the period 2001–2015. Market data are from Datastream; accounting data are 
from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. 
 
A. CDS availability by country and year 
 
(continued)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average Creditor Rights
Hong Kong 4 5 7 10 14 21 30 37 38 37 39 44 45 45 7 26 4
New Zealand 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 4
United Kingdom 31 48 62 65 66 69 64 59 58 58 60 60 55 58 32 56 4
Australia 9 17 20 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 23 23 17 21 3
Austria 1 1 2 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 2 4 3
Czech Republic 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Denmark 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3
Germany 17 20 29 36 37 40 41 43 45 45 44 44 45 45 10 36 3
Israel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 3
Korea, Republic of 4 9 10 11 16 17 18 20 21 23 25 27 27 27 18 3
Malaysia 2 2 2 3 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 4 5 3
Netherlands 8 9 13 15 15 16 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 1 12 3
Saudi Arabia 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3
Singapore 1 2 3 3 5 5 7 7 7 7 9 10 10 10 1 6 3
South Africa 1 2 2 2 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 4 4 3
Belgium 1 1 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 2
Chile 1 2 3 3 5 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 2
Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
India 1 1 1 6 15 32 49 50 52 53 52 51 52 43 33 2
Indonesia 2 5 5 5 7 7 8 9 9 9 7 2
Italy 7 9 10 14 15 17 18 19 20 20 18 19 22 23 17 2
Japan 27 61 121 202 247 267 285 289 288 286 282 278 280 276 255 230 2
Kazakhstan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Norway 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 5 2
Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Russian Federation 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 2
Spain 5 7 8 11 11 11 13 13 12 10 10 12 12 12 11 2
Sri Lanka 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Taiwan 6 16 20 24 26 27 27 26 26 28 27 27 23 2
Thailand 2 2 2 6 7 10 9 9 10 8 8 8 8 7 2
Turkey 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2
Argentina 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 2 1
Brazil 2 6 7 9 12 16 16 14 14 13 12 11 1
Canada 9 18 25 37 42 42 39 39 37 37 34 34 32 34 3 31 1
Finland 5 7 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 1
Greece 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Hungary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Philippines 1 2 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 1 5 1
Poland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 1
Sweden 7 10 10 12 12 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 12 13 1 12 1
Switzerland 4 7 7 9 11 11 12 14 13 13 12 13 13 13 11 1
United States 251 347 447 566 615 641 670 661 655 634 626 623 609 599 130 538 1
Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
France 28 36 42 44 45 45 44 45 43 42 43 45 47 48 4 40 0
Mexico 1 1 3 4 7 9 10 10 12 11 11 11 8 0
Bahrain 1 1 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 2 1 2
Qatar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
United Arab Emirates 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 1. International CDS introductions and availability (continued) 
B. CDS introductions by country and year 
 
(continued) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total Creditor Rights
Hong Kong 1 2 3 4 7 9 7 1 2 5 1 42 4
New Zealand 1 1 2 4
United Kingdom 18 14 5 2 7 4 4 1 2 2 2 61 4
Australia 8 3 3 2 3 1 1 21 3
Austria 1 1 2 1 1 6 3
Czech Republic 1 1 2 3
Denmark 2 1 3 3
Germany 4 9 7 3 3 2 2 2 2 34 3
Israel 1 1 1 3 3
Korea, Republic of 5 1 1 5 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 23 3
Malaysia 1 3 1 5 3
Netherlands 2 3 2 1 1 1 10 3
Saudi Arabia 1 1 2 3
Singapore 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 10 3
South Africa 1 1 2 1 1 6 3
Belgium 1 3 1 1 6 2
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 2 7 2
Egypt 1 1 2
India 1 5 9 17 17 3 2 3 57 2
Indonesia 2 3 2 2 9 2
Italy 2 1 5 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 18 2
Japan 34 62 81 46 24 20 10 6 1 2 2 288 2
Kazakhstan 1 1 2
Norway 1 2 2 5 2
Romania 1 1 2
Russian Federation 2 1 2 5 2
Spain 2 1 3 2 1 1 10 2
Sri Lanka 1 1 2
Taiwan 6 10 4 4 2 1 2 29 2
Thailand 2 4 1 4 1 12 2
Turkey 2 2 2
Argentina 1 1 1 3 1
Brazil 2 4 1 2 3 5 17 1
Canada 9 7 12 6 3 1 1 1 1 1 42 1
Finland 2 1 1 4 1
Greece 1 1 2 1
Hungary 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1 2 1
Philippines 1 1 1 2 1 1 7 1
Poland 0 1
Portugal 1 1 1 3 1
Sweden 3 2 2 7 1
Switzerland 3 2 2 2 2 11 1
United States 105 116 113 74 46 67 15 9 6 11 19 6 5 1 593 1
Colombia 1 1 2 0
France 10 6 4 1 1 1 2 2 1 28 0




United Arab Emirates 1 1
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Table 1. International CDS introductions and availability (continued) 
C. CDS availability by industry and year 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average
Agriculture 1 1 2 2 4 5 6 5 7 6 7 7 6 6 3 5
Food Products 11 14 20 24 31 33 36 36 36 35 36 38 38 37 18 30
Candy & Soda 4 4 5 9 10 11 12 11 11 8 9 9 9 9 1 8
Beer & Liquor 6 9 13 16 16 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 15 15 6 14
Tobacco Products 9 9 8 9 9 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 8
Recreation 4 7 8 12 13 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 12 12 8 10
Entertainment 5 6 8 12 14 16 19 17 18 18 16 17 16 17 7 14
Printing and Publishing 9 10 13 18 21 24 20 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 6 16
Consumer Goods 15 17 22 24 25 25 25 27 26 26 26 27 27 26 9 23
Apparel 5 6 8 12 12 11 9 10 10 11 11 9 10 9 1 9
Healthcare 3 4 10 13 13 14 14 16 17 17 17 16 16 15 2 12
Medical Equipment 4 7 10 11 12 12 15 15 15 14 15 16 17 17 7 12
Pharmaceutical Products 10 20 26 38 41 45 51 49 43 42 41 40 39 41 12 36
Chemicals 19 30 40 54 65 64 64 68 69 70 67 67 68 68 25 56
Rubber and Plastic Products 1 1 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 4
Textiles 1 2 4 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 5
Construction Materials 7 15 19 27 31 30 34 37 37 37 36 36 35 35 13 29
Construction 3 11 17 27 33 42 56 62 64 64 64 68 66 67 31 45
Steel Works Etc 10 13 18 29 35 35 38 44 43 44 45 46 46 46 25 34
Fabricated Products 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Machinery 10 25 35 45 50 55 56 56 56 55 56 56 56 57 33 47
Electrical Equipment 3 6 10 12 17 18 21 22 22 21 21 18 18 18 10 16
Automobiles and Trucks 25 34 39 47 56 60 63 64 63 60 61 63 63 60 22 52
Aircraft 6 8 10 11 11 11 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 1 10
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 2 2 2 3 4 4 3 4 2 3
Defense 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
Precious Metals 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 3 8 13 15 16 15 17 18 18 18 19 19 18 19 6 15
Coal 1 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 6 5
Petroleum and Natural Gas 27 45 55 63 66 76 81 81 81 80 77 82 80 83 9 66
Utilities 43 71 87 117 137 148 150 153 150 146 147 141 143 139 32 120
Communication 46 55 74 79 92 97 101 104 107 103 102 106 105 102 24 86
Personal Services 1 3 3 4 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 9 7 8 1 6
Business Services 13 21 35 52 63 68 73 73 72 75 75 80 77 78 27 59
Computers 9 9 14 19 23 27 28 27 28 27 26 27 27 27 11 22
Electronic Equipment 15 22 38 57 65 71 69 71 71 68 67 62 61 60 22 55
Measuring and Control Equipment 4 8 10 12 13 13 14 14 14 14 13 13 13 13 8 12
Business Supplies 11 12 14 21 24 26 32 32 34 34 31 33 33 33 11 25
Shipping Containers 4 5 10 12 12 12 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 13 2 11
Transportation 21 35 52 75 79 85 87 87 89 86 88 91 94 93 44 74
Wholesale 8 14 19 22 33 36 37 40 40 38 39 38 36 36 21 30
Retail 37 44 53 69 74 81 92 94 91 90 90 87 85 85 34 74
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 10 15 20 26 26 30 29 31 33 33 32 33 33 33 13 26
Other Industries 3 4 6 6 6 7 8 9 9 9 7 7 6 7 2 6
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Table 2. Propensity for CDS introduction 
The table shows the results of logit regressions in which the CDS introduction dummy (i.e., only the first year of CDS trading for each firm) is the dependent variable. 
Firm characteristics and country characteristics serve as explanatory variables, and all are lagged by one year. (Standardized) country variables are grouped into four 
categories: (1) creditor rights, (2) property rights, (3) private credit availability, and (4) financial market sophistication. The last column uses the (standardized) firm-level 
variable Closely Held Shares instead of a country variable. For creditor rights, we use an aggregate index (Creditor Rights) as well as its four subindexes, namely, restrictions 
on a firm entering reorganization without creditors’ consent (Restrictions on Entry); no automatic stay or asset freeze (No Automatic Stay); restriction on management’s 
administration of a firm’s assets pending resolution of the reorganization (Management Does Not Stay); and payment of secured creditors first out of any liquidation proceeds 
(Secured Creditors First). For property rights, we consider the following three measures: Law & Order, Corruption, and Political Risk, where higher index values indicate 
stronger protection for private properties. Private credit availability is measured by domestic credit by financial corporations to the private sector scaled by GDP (Domestic 
Credit to Private Sector) and by total credit to the private nonfinancial sector scaled by GDP (Private Credit). Financial market sophistication is measured by the ratio of 
market capitalization of CDS firms to that of all firms in a country (CDS Market); stock market capitalization scaled by GDP (Stock Market); and market capitalization of 
the private bond market scaled by GDP (Private Bond Market). For equity ownership concentration, we use the percentage of closely held shares (Closely Held Shares). All 
regressions include the following firm characteristics as controls: the natural logarithm of total assets (in USD), Tobin’s q, the market-to-book equity ratio, return on 
assets (3-year average), gross profit margin (3-year average), a dividend dummy, cash flow to sales, free cash flow to total assets, the natural logarithm of cash and short-
term investments, capital expenditures to total assets, R&D to assets, net PP&E to size, market leverage, industry median market leverage, convertible debt to size, debt 
maturity, return volatility in local currency and in USD, volatility of return on assets, net foreign exchange exposure, firm age, and tax rate. Regressions also include year 
and Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel 
of more than 56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 countries over the period 2001–2015. Appendix D defines all variables. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 











Order Corruption Political Risk












Country/Firm Variable -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.310*** -0.129*** 0.241*** 0.049 -0.009 -0.018 0.329*** -0.068 0.450*** 0.118*** 0.276*** -0.259***
(0.042) (0.048) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.041) (0.049) (0.056) (0.062) (0.054) (0.145) (0.045) (0.049) (0.041)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822
Pseudo R -Squared 0.397 0.396 0.400 0.397 0.399 0.396 0.396 0.396 0.400 0.396 0.401 0.396 0.400 0.400
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Table 3. Firm- and country-level characteristics without imposition of overlap 
weights 
The table compares firm- and country-level characteristics between firm-years with CDS introductions (treated) and with-
out CDS introductions (control) in the prior year. It reports the mean and standard errors for treated and control firms; 
the percentage bias according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985); and test statistics and p-values of t-tests and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 countries 
over the period 2001–2015. Market data are from Datastream; accounting data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are 
from Markit. The sample is limited to firm-year observations for which all reported firm- and country-level variables are 
jointly available. Given the differences in characteristics between treated and control firms, we use overlap weights (Li, 
Morgan, and Zaslavsky 2018) for our main analysis that balance the covariates between these samples (see Table E2 in 
Appendix E). Appendix D defines all variables. 
 
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. t p -value D p -value
Firm Characteristics
Cash Flow/Sales 0.149 0.004 0.112 0.001 28% 6.7 0.000 0.1399 0.000
Convertible Debt/Size 0.011 0.001 0.002 0.000 53% 22.2 0.000 0.2061 0.000
Debt Maturity 0.756 0.008 0.528 0.001 79% 18.8 0.000 0.3084 0.000
Dividend 0.835 0.013 0.758 0.002 19% 5.0 0.000 0.0771 0.000
Free Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.025 0.002 0.026 0.000 -2% -0.4 0.687 0.0647 0.003
Gross Profit Margin (3y) 0.306 0.006 0.271 0.001 20% 5.4 0.000 0.1027 0.000
Leverage Market Value 0.242 0.005 0.190 0.001 33% 9.0 0.000 0.2047 0.000
Leverage Market Value (Industry Median) 0.167 0.003 0.152 0.000 20% 5.7 0.000 0.1056 0.000
Age (log) 2.791 0.027 2.552 0.003 32% 9.0 0.000 0.2779 0.000
ROA Volatility (log) -3.900 0.031 -3.541 0.004 -38% -10.1 0.000 0.1498 0.000
Total Assets in USD (log) 21.773 0.023 19.526 0.006 189% 40.3 0.000 0.6955 0.000
Market/Book 2.479 0.069 1.943 0.007 28% 8.0 0.000 0.2350 0.000
Net FX-Exposure 0.119 0.008 0.117 0.001 1% 0.2 0.809 0.0751 0.000
PPE (Net)/Size 0.395 0.010 0.391 0.001 2% 0.4 0.691 0.0615 0.006
Return On Assets (3y) 0.062 0.002 0.061 0.000 3% 0.7 0.506 0.0520 0.030
Tax Rate 0.344 0.005 0.304 0.001 27% 7.0 0.000 0.1795 0.000
Tobin's Q 1.321 0.034 1.181 0.004 14% 3.8 0.000 0.2125 0.000
Return Volatility in LC (log) -1.146 0.013 -0.969 0.002 -43% -10.6 0.000 0.1812 0.000
Return Volatility in USD (log) -1.108 0.013 -0.915 0.002 -46% -11.6 0.000 0.1989 0.000
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 0.060 0.002 0.051 0.000 18% 4.8 0.000 0.1565 0.000
R&D/Total Assets 0.014 0.001 0.010 0.000 15% 4.5 0.000 0.1173 0.000
Cash and Short-Term Investments/Total Assets (log) -2.721 0.046 -2.383 0.005 -26% -7.1 0.000 0.1169 0.000
Closely Held Shares -0.628 0.035 0.040 0.004 -67% -18.0 0.000 0.3007 0.000
Country Characteristics
Restrictions on Entry -0.209 0.030 0.091 0.004 -23% -8.0 0.000 0.1304 0.000
No Automatic Stay -0.300 0.029 0.093 0.004 1% -10.6 0.000 0.1831 0.000
Management Does Not Stay -0.141 0.036 0.065 0.004 18% -5.8 0.000 0.1027 0.000
Secured Creditors First 0.105 0.030 0.006 0.004 10% 2.8 0.005 0.0304 0.468
Law & Order 0.240 0.034 -0.054 0.004 49% 8.1 0.000 0.1330 0.000
Corruption 0.090 0.028 -0.002 0.003 37% 2.6 0.009 0.1551 0.000
Political Risk 0.386 0.028 0.017 0.003 1% 10.7 0.000 0.2339 0.000
Domestic Credit to Private Sector 0.344 0.032 0.044 0.003 20% 8.6 0.000 0.2517 0.000
Private Credit 0.022 0.029 -0.026 0.004 6% 1.4 0.174 0.1378 0.000
CDS Market 0.225 0.030 0.062 0.003 29% 5.2 0.000 0.2541 0.000
Stock Market 0.030 0.033 0.088 0.004 -10% -1.4 0.175 0.1169 0.000





Treated          
(N = 784)
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Table 4. Effects of CDSs on leverage 
The table shows the average treatment effect of CDS introductions on the market leverage (defined as the sum of total debt and preferred stock divided by market value 
of total assets) of the treated firms (ATET) using overlap weights (Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky 2018). The treatment is the introduction of CDSs (i.e., only the first year 
of CDS trading for each firm). The regressions further include CDS interaction effects with lagged (standardized) conditioning variables, as well as the lagged conditioning 
variables themselves. The use of overlap weights ensures that covariates are perfectly balanced between treated firms and control firms in the year before treatment (see 
table E2 in Appendix E). Conditioning variables are grouped into three categories: (1) creditor rights, (2) property rights, and (3) equity ownership concentration. For 
creditor rights, we use an aggregate index (Creditor Rights) as well as its four subindexes, namely, restrictions on a firm entering reorganization without creditors’ consent 
(Restrictions on Entry); no automatic stay or asset freeze (No Automatic Stay); restriction on management’s administration of a firm’s assets pending resolution of the 
reorganization (Management Does Not Stay); and payment of secured creditors first out of any liquidation proceeds (Secured Creditors First). For property rights, we consider 
the following three measures: Law & Order, Corruption, and Political Risk, where higher index values indicate stronger protection for private properties. For equity owner-
ship concentration, we use the percentage of closely held shares (Closely Held Shares). All regressions include year and Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 
countries over the period 2001–2015. Market data are from Datastream; accounting data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. Appendix D defines all 
variables. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 













Order Corruption Political Risk
0.0028 0.0128** -0.0063 -0.0069 0.0149** -0.0190*** -0.0080 -0.0304*** 0.0134**
(0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0057)
Conditioning Variable 0.0003 -0.0120*** 0.0018 0.0125*** -0.0095*** -0.0002 -0.0112*** 0.0065 0.0126***
(0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0035)
CDS Introduction 0.0123** 0.0129** 0.0144** 0.0106* 0.0115** 0.0111** 0.0156*** 0.0128** 0.0225*** 0.0198***
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0069)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501
Adj. R -Squared 0.187 0.187 0.189 0.188 0.191 0.189 0.193 0.193 0.195 0.202
CDS Introduction  x Conditioning 
Variable
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis for omitted variables 
The table reports tests of the sensitivity of the regression results in table 4 to the effect of unobserved omitted variables in the estimation of the balancing weights, using 
a simulation approach proposed by Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2008). The regression specifications (2) to (10) are the same as in table 4. The key treatment indicator 
is the CDS introduction dummy. Its interaction effects with (standardized) conditioning characteristics are also jointly estimated. Conditioning variables are grouped into 
three categories: (1) creditor rights, (2) property rights, and (3) equity ownership concentration. For creditor rights, we use an aggregate index (Creditor Rights) as well as 
its four subindexes, namely, restrictions on a firm entering reorganization without creditors’ consent (Restrictions on Entry); no automatic stay or asset freeze (No Automatic 
Stay); restriction on management’s administration of a firm’s assets pending resolution of the reorganization (Management Does Not Stay); and payment of secured creditors 
first out of any liquidation proceeds (Secured Creditors First). For property rights, we consider the following three measures: Law & Order, Corruption, and Political Risk, 
where higher index values indicate stronger protection for private properties. For equity ownership concentration, we use the percentage of closely held shares (Closely 
Held Shares). The sensitivity analysis simulates alternatively calibrated confounders or killer confounders in the estimation of the balancing weights that are subsequently 
used to assess the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) using overlap weights (Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky 2018). Calibrated confounders are specified to have 
an empirical distribution similar to the existing observable covariates in the logit regression that yields the inputs to the balancing weights. We use binary transformations 
of continuous covariates, that is, indicator variables of whether an observation is above or below the median of that variable. Separately, we also use killer confounders 
to assess whether more extreme unobserved omitted covariates exist that eliminate the treatment effect. We simulate 100 iterations of calibrated and killer confounders 
and reestimate the effect of CDS introductions and their interactions with conditioning variables for each iteration. Further details on the methodology are provided in 
Appendix B. For each outcome regression specification, the table reports the minimum and maximum coefficients for the interaction variables across calibrated and 
killer confounders. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 countries 
over the period 2001–2015. All variables are defined in Appendix D. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 












Order Corruption Political Risk
Calibrated Confounders Minimum 0.0025 0.0124*  -0.0071 -0.0071 0.0147** -0.0191*** -0.0086 -0.0304*** 0.0132**
Maximum 0.0031 0.0131** -0.0057 -0.0066 0.0152*** -0.0182*** -0.0071 -0.0294*** 0.0141**
Killer Confounders Minimum 0.0017 0.0100    -0.0085 -0.0087 0.0118*   -0.0211*** -0.0084 -0.0342*** 0.0130**
Maximum 0.0042 0.0155**  -0.0004 -0.0053 0.01512** -0.0158*** -0.0056 -0.0255*** 0.0161**
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Appendix A. CDS Contracts and the Local Legal Environment 
The ISDA Master Agreement and its annexures for CDS contracts standardize definitions and lan-
guage in order to create a more homogeneous and liquid product and to reduce basis risk and trans-
actions costs. Nevertheless, the specific local legal environment in which a reference entity is head-
quartered is important for the CDS contract. In effect, the laws to which the reference entity is subject 
must be mapped to the language used in the CDS contract. Below we describe two recent cases in 
which an analysis of local law was required in order to determine whether a credit event had occurred. 
A.1 Abengoa 
Abengoa, a Spanish conglomerate, filed for insolvency relief under a provision of Spanish law in No-
vember 2015. The regional Determination Committee (DC), in considering whether a credit event had 
occurred, sought an analysis of whether the specific provision that Abengoa had triggered (Article 
5bis) was relief that was similar to “a judgment of insolvency or bankruptcy,” as the 2014 ISDA Def-
initions of Credit Events required. In its analysis, the DC noted that Article 5bis provided relief only 
for certain Abengoa assets, was quite time limited, and suspended enforcement of claims but did not 
suspend payment obligations. On the basis of this analysis of a specific provision of Spanish insol-
vency law, the DC determined that no credit event had occurred.34 
A.2 Portugal Telecom 
In late 2013, Portugal Telecom and a Brazilian telecommunications company, Oi, announced a merger 
that was subsequently completed in 2014. Portugal Telecom had a financing subsidiary, PTIF, which 
was a CDS reference entity in Europe. In June 2015, Oi sold Portugal Telecom but retained PTIF. In 
June 2016, Oi and its subsidiaries filed for reorganization under Brazilian law. The DC considered 
elements of reorganization law in Brazil in order to assess whether this filing constituted a credit event. 
They concluded that specific elements of the law, including an automatic stay (allowing the firm relief 
from its creditors), payment relief during reorganization (combined with the fact that reorganization 
would take a considerable period of time), and elements of the debt restructuring that were allowed 
under the reorganization, were similar to a judgment of insolvency or bankruptcy. As a consequence, 
the DC ruled that a credit event had occurred.
                                                 






/rfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhab092/6357050 by guest on 31 August 2021
51 
Appendix B. Methodology of the Sensitivity Analysis 
This appendix provides a nontechnical description of the methodology used for the sensitivity analysis 
in the paper. 
We adapt and apply the methodology of Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2008) to the setting of 
overlap weights by Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky (2018) employed in our paper. As described in Section 
5, to use the overlap weight methodology we begin by estimating the propensity of CDS introduction 
for firm i in year t as pit(xt) = Pr (Zit = 1|Xikt = xt), where Xikt is a set of k observed covariates, and Zit 
= 1 indicates CDS introduction. The observed covariates are firm and country characteristics (e.g., 
total assets, market-to-book, the creditor rights index, and political risk, etc.). Subsequently, we use 
the estimated propensities pit(xt) to obtain the overlap weights wit (defined as wit = pit(xt) for Zit = 0, and 
wit = 1 – pit(xt) for Zit = 1). We then weight the observations in our panel regressions and, in the 
weighted sample, estimate the treatment effect of CDS introductions. 
Propensity-score matching techniques, as well as weighting based on estimated propensities, 
rely on the assumption of conditional independence or “unconfoundedness” of potential outcomes 
and treatment assignment, given observable covariates (Rosenbaum 1987; Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1985). The objective of the sensitivity analysis by Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2008) is to assess 
whether and to what extent the estimated average treatment effects are robust to possible deviations 
from the conditional independence assumption. To this end, it introduces unobserved confounders 
Ut into the logit regression (i.e., pit(xt , Ut) = Pr (Zit = 1|Xikt = xt , Ut)), and then employs the resultant 
estimated probabilities for propensity-score matching in order to assess the average treatment effect 
on the treated. Our overlap weighting approach, in contrast, uses the resultant propensities as balanc-
ing weights. However, we can adapt the Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2008) method to overlap 
weights and assess the influence of deviations from the conditional independence assumption on those 
results. 
The general approach is based on the conjecture that adding one additional covariate, Ut , to a 
set of observables is needed to satisfy unconfoundedness. While the confounding variable is not ob-
served, it can be simulated. Comparing regression results using overlap weights from propensity esti-
mations with and without the simulated confounder provides evidence on the robustness (or sensitiv-
ity) of the set of observables to deviations from the conditional independence assumption. Simulation 
of the additional variable Ut can be based on alternative distributional assumptions, which depend on 
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binary and independent of the set of observables. Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2008) consider alter-
natively calibrated and killer confounders. 
Calibrated confounders are specified to have an empirical distribution similar to existing ob-
servable regressors in the logit regression that generates the input for the balancing weights—that is, 
calibrated confounders mimic the behavior of important covariates (i.e., total assets, political risk, etc.). 
Given that the logit regressions to estimate the propensity of CDS introduction have a number of 
firm-level and country-level covariates, we consider the distribution of each of them in turn to specify 
the empirical distribution of the simulated confounding variable. Since the unobserved confounder is 
assumed to be binary, we follow Nannicini (2007) and use binary transformations of continuous co-
variates, specifically, indicator variables of whether an observation is above or below the median of 
that variable. Simulations with calibrated confounders assess to what extent the panel regression re-
sults are robust to violations of the conditional independence assumption that originate from unob-
served confounding factors similar to the ones used to calibrate the confounding variable. 
Sensitivity analysis using calibrated confounders is limited by the fact that the distributional 
properties of the confounding variables are determined by the particular behavior of the set of ob-
served covariates. Therefore, we also generate “killer confounders” to assess whether more extreme 
unobserved omitted covariates exist that eliminate the treatment effect. This approach specifies a grid 
of possible parameters that determine the empirical distribution of the confounder in order to capture 
the characteristics of potential confounders that could drive the estimated treatment effect to zero. As 
a consequence, killer confounders are designed to capture extreme scenarios that are based purely on 
statistical possibilities; any parameter sets that kill the treatment effect need to be checked subsequently 
for plausibility. Sensitivity analysis with killer confounders may confirm the robustness of the baseline 
results if only very unlikely parameter configurations wipe out the treatment effect. 
For each panel regression specification, we simulate 100 iterations of calibrated and killer con-
founders. For each iteration, we reestimate the propensity of CDS introduction using the set of ob-
served covariates and the simulated unobserved confounder, use the resultant balancing weights to 
estimate the effect of CDS introductions and their interactions with conditioning variables on the 
outcome variable, and report the minimum and maximum coefficients for the interaction variables 
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Appendix C. Derivation of Proposition 1 
For   2
HN q C and/or  2
LN q C , where 
i i
C CF F  for i = L,H, we define the firm’s net im-
provement in its debt value due to CDS as CDSB B B   . As CDS are written on the existing debt 
obligations, we consider only the case in which debt financing is feasible in the absence of CDS (B > 
0). Hence, we focus on the case 
H
CF F F  . 
When the outstanding CDS notional is not excessive  2( )
LN C , the increase in debt value 
with CDS, ΔB, is given as 
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For the case with excessive CDS notional,  2
LN C , which causes the empty creditor prob-
lem, ΔB is given as 
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Appendix D.  
Table D1. Variable definitions 





Cash Flow/Sales Cash Flow/Sales
Convertible Debt/Size Convertible Debt / SizeMarketValue
Debt Maturity [LongTermDebt (due more than 1 year) + PreferredStock] / TotalDebtAndPreferredStock
Dividend Dummy variable with value 1 if a dividend was paid; 0 otherwise
Free Cash Flow/Total Assets (FundsFromOperations - CapitalExpendituresAdditi - CashDividendsPaidTotal) / TotalAssets
Gross Profit Margin (3y) Average of up to 3 years of GrossProfitMargin
Leverage Market Value TotalDebtAndPreferredStock / TotalAssetsMarketValue
Leverage Market Value (Industry Median) TotalDebtAndPreferredStock / TotalAssetsMarketValue, Industry median
Age (log) log (Age)
ROA Volatility (log) Natural logarithm of ROAVolatility
Total Assets in USD (log) Natural logarithm of TotalAssetsUSD
Market/Book MarketValue/(CommonEquity + DeferredTaxes)
Net FX Exposure Foreign Sales - Foreign Assets (missing values set to zero)
PPE (Net)/Size PPENet / SizeMarketValue
Return On Assets (3y) Average of up to 3 years of ReturnOnAssets
Tax Rate Tax Rate
Tobin's Q SizeMarketValue / TotalAssets
Return Volatility in LC (log) Natural logarithm of volatility of weekly stock returns in local currency
Return Volatility in USD (log) Natural logarithm of volatility of weekly stock returns in USD
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets Capital Expenditure / TotalAssets (missing values set to zero)
R&D/Total Assets ResearchDevelopment / TotalAssets (missing values set to zero)
Cash and Short-term Investments/Total Assets (log) Natural logarithm of CashAndSTInvToTA_tru
R&D Share R&D/(R&D + Capital Expenditures), with R&D Share  set to zero if R&D and Capital 
Expenditures are both zero.
Idiosyncratic Risk in LC (log) Natural logarithm of the annualized volatility of the residual from a regression of weekly stock 
returns in local currency on local and global market index returns
Closely Held Shares Percentage of shares held by insiders
Country Characteristics
Creditor Rights Creditor Rights Aggregate Score (from Djankov et al., 2007)
Restrictions on Entry Restrictions on the borrower entering reorganization without the creditors’ consent (from 
Djankov et al., 2007)
No Automatic Stay No automatic stay or asset freeze to protect the firm from creditors (from Djankov et al., 2007)
Management Does Not Stay Restrictions on current management administering the assets while in reorganization (from 
Djankov et al., 2007)
Secured Creditors First Priority of secured creditors in payments resulting from liquidation (from Djankov et al., 2007)
Law & Order A measure of the strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as popular observance of the 
law (PRS Group, 2015)
Corruption A measure of corruption within the political system that can threaten foreign investment (PRS 
Group, 2015)
Political Risk Degree of political stability within the country, using a variety of measures (PRS Group, 2015)
Domestic Credit to Private Sector Ratio of private credit from banks to GDP (World Bank, 2016)
Private Credit Ratio of total credit in the nonfinancial sector to GDP (Bank for International Settlements, 2015)
CDS Market Ratio of total stock market capitalization of CDS firms to GDP
Stock Market Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (World Bank, 2016)
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Appendix E. Additional Tests 
 
Table E1. Summary statistics of variables 
The table reports summary statistics of the main variables used in the study (panel A) and their correlations (panel B). The 
sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 countries over the period 2001–
2015. Market data are from Datastream; accounting data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. All varia-
bles are defined in Appendix D. 
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum p25 p50 p75 Maximum
Firm Characteristics
Cash Flow/Sales 380,555 -0.14 0.78 -3.11 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.38
Convertible Debt/Size 260,840 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Debt Maturity 342,920 0.50 0.36 0.00 0.14 0.53 0.84 1.00
Dividend 416,784 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Free Cash Flow/Total Assets 409,355 -0.07 0.23 -0.84 -0.09 0.00 0.05 0.15
Gross Profit Margin (3y) 386,086 0.20 0.33 -0.87 0.11 0.22 0.38 0.69
Leverage Market Value 344,268 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.30 0.56
Leverage Market Value (Industry Median) 416,784 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.28
Age (log) 416,752 2.03 1.08 0.00 1.39 2.30 2.83 3.95
ROA Volatility (log) 293,866 -3.00 1.27 -5.07 -3.95 -3.13 -2.15 -0.41
Total Assets in USD (log) 416,760 18.27 2.24 13.76 16.83 18.32 19.83 22.31
Market/Book 343,708 2.17 2.26 0.27 0.72 1.33 2.60 9.14
Net FX Exposure 416,784 0.08 0.22 -0.74 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.98
PPE (Net)/Size 368,729 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.58 1.27
Return On Assets (3y) 375,617 -0.06 0.27 -0.94 -0.05 0.03 0.08 0.19
Tax Rate 242,250 0.29 0.17 0.00 0.18 0.29 0.39 0.66
Tobin's Q 371,913 1.59 1.74 0.31 0.61 0.93 1.67 7.40
Return Volatility in LC (log) 364,728 -0.71 0.60 -1.71 -1.16 -0.75 -0.30 0.47
Return Volatility in USD (log) 361,711 -0.665 0.59 -1.65 -1.11 -0.71 -0.26 0.50
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 416,784 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.21
R&D/Total Assets 416,784 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.15
Cash and Short-Term Investments/Total Assets (log) 413,586 -2.25 1.54 -5.56 -3.23 -2.10 -1.09 0.00
R&D Share 416,784 0.15 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.00
Idiosyncratic Risk in LC (log) 360,292 -0.82 0.63 -1.89 -1.30 -0.87 -0.39 0.42
Closely Held Shares 416,338 0.44 0.23 0.02 0.27 0.44 0.60 0.88
Country Characteristics
Creditor Rights 415,811 2.00 1.02 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
Restrictions on Entry 415,811 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
No Automatic Stay 415,811 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Management Does Not Stay 415,811 0.53 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Secured Creditors First 415,811 0.90 0.31 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Law & Order 415,905 4.85 0.88 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00
Corruption 415,905 3.69 1.01 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.50 6.00
Political Risk 415,905 78.48 8.64 44.00 76.50 80.50 84.00 97.00
Domestic Credit to Private Sector 393,829 133.80 53.88 8.77 96.44 137.10 182.40 233.70
Private Credit 378,638 146.30 48.16 16.80 130.30 157.30 175.00 462.10
CDS Market 416,784 24.82 4.64 0.00 24.19 25.22 27.33 28.27
Stock Market 393,829 108.50 73.62 7.27 68.58 103.40 126.70 569.50







/rfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhab092/6357050 by guest on 31 August 2021
57 



























Restrictions on Entry 0.504
No Automatic Stay 0.791 0.272
Management Does Not Stay 0.689 0.017 0.391
Secured Creditors First 0.281 -0.185 0.084 0.042
Law & Order 0.023 -0.278 0.087 -0.012 0.356
Corruption -0.040 -0.305 0.113 -0.116 0.317 0.724
Political Risk -0.024 -0.425 0.085 0.041 0.328 0.790 0.767
Domestic Credit to Private Sector -0.045 -0.336 -0.134 0.031 0.478 0.477 0.445 0.575
Private Credit 0.128 -0.319 0.151 0.181 0.373 0.667 0.623 0.710 0.727
CDS Market -0.113 -0.189 -0.129 -0.107 0.264 0.393 0.319 0.368 0.550 0.388
Stock Market 0.340 0.245 0.284 0.057 0.270 0.182 0.260 0.226 0.346 0.372 0.161
Private Bond Market -0.407 -0.476 -0.227 -0.353 0.205 0.328 0.269 0.358 0.608 0.343 0.431 0.003
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Table E2. Firm- and country-level characteristics with imposition of overlap 
weights 
The table compares firm- and country-level characteristics between firm-years with CDS introductions (Treated) and with-
out CDS introductions (Control) in the prior year. It shows the mean and standard errors for treated and control firms, 
the percentage bias according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), and the expected absolute density deviation (EADD), 
defined as    | |treated controlx f x f x dx  for all control variables. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 
56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 countries over the period 2001–2015. Market data are from Datastream; accounting 
data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. The sample is limited to firm-year observations for which all 
reported firm- and country-level variables are jointly available. Observations are weighted using overlap weights (Li, Mor-
gan, and Zaslavsky 2018). All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
 
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Cash Flow/Sales 0.149 0.004 0.149 0.002 0% 0.024
Convertible Debt/Size 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.000 0% 0.001
Debt Maturity 0.751 0.009 0.751 0.003 0% 0.101
Dividend 0.836 0.013 0.836 0.005 0% 0.002
Free Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.024 0.002 0.024 0.001 0% -0.002
Gross Profit Margin (3y) 0.305 0.006 0.305 0.003 0% 0.046
Leverage Market Value 0.239 0.005 0.239 0.003 0% 0.043
Leverage Market Value (Industry Median) 0.165 0.003 0.165 0.001 0% 0.017
Age (log) 2.761 0.029 2.761 0.011 0% 0.365
ROA Volatility (log) -3.881 0.032 -3.881 0.014 0% -0.428
Total Assets in USD (log) 21.716 0.025 21.716 0.007 0% 3.102
Market/Book 2.440 0.069 2.440 0.032 0% 0.507
Net FX Exposure 0.122 0.009 0.122 0.003 0% 0.031
PPE (Net)/Size 0.395 0.011 0.395 0.004 0% 0.051
Return On Assets (3y) 0.063 0.002 0.063 0.001 0% 0.006
Tax Rate 0.339 0.005 0.339 0.002 0% 0.049
Tobin's Q 1.301 0.032 1.301 0.014 0% 0.344
Return Volatility in LC (log) -1.141 0.013 -1.141 0.006 0% -0.104
Return Volatility in USD (log) -1.101 0.014 -1.101 0.006 0% -0.123
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 0.060 0.002 0.060 0.001 0% 0.013
R&D/Total Assets 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.000 0% 0.005
Cash and Short-Term Investments/Total Assets (log) -2.683 0.047 -2.683 0.019 0% -0.327
Closely Held Shares -0.564 0.036 -0.564 0.015 0% -0.025
Restrictions on Entry -0.168 0.033 -0.168 0.012 0% 0.002
No Automatic Stay -0.259 0.032 -0.259 0.011 0% 0.003
Management Does Not Stay -0.118 0.036 -0.118 0.015 0% 0.001
Secured Creditors First 0.079 0.033 0.079 0.011 0% -0.003
Law & Order 0.174 0.036 0.174 0.016 0% 0.119
Corruption 0.063 0.030 0.063 0.013 0% 0.123
Political Risk 0.337 0.031 0.337 0.012 0% -0.042
Domestic Credit to Private Sector 0.293 0.036 0.293 0.012 0% -0.046
Private Credit -0.005 0.032 -0.005 0.011 0% -0.053
CDS Market 0.194 0.034 0.194 0.010 0% -0.027
Stock Market 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.011 0% 0.140
Private Bond Market 0.278 0.038 0.278 0.015 0% 0.010
Country Characteristics
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Table E3. Effects of CDS on capital investment 
The table shows the average treatment effect of CDS introductions on the capital investment (defined as capital expenditures divided by total assets) of the treated firms 
(ATET) using overlap weights (Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky 2018). The treatment is the introduction of CDS (i.e., only the first year of CDS trading for each firm). The 
regressions further include CDS interaction effects with lagged (standardized) conditioning variables, as well as the lagged conditioning variables themselves. The use of 
overlap weights ensures that covariates are perfectly balanced between treated firms and control firms in the year before treatment (see Table E2 in Appendix E). 
Conditioning variables are grouped into three categories: (1) creditor rights, (2) property rights, and (3) equity ownership concentration. For creditor rights, we use an 
aggregate index (Creditor Rights) as well as its four subindexes, namely, restrictions on a firm entering reorganization without creditors’ consent (Restrictions on Entry); no 
automatic stay or asset freeze (No Automatic Stay); restriction on management’s administration of a firm’s assets pending resolution of the reorganization (Management Does 
Not Stay); and payment of secured creditors first out of any liquidation proceeds (Secured Creditors First). For property rights, we consider the following three measures: 
Law & Order, Corruption, and Political Risk, where higher index values indicate stronger protection for private properties. For equity ownership concentration, we use the 
percentage of closely held shares (Closely Held Shares). All regressions include year and Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level and are reported in parentheses. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 countries over the period 2001–
2015. Market data are from Datastream; accounting data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. All variables are defined in Appendix D. *p < .1; **p < 
.05; ***p < .01. 
 
  













Order Corruption Political Risk
0.0031* 0.0053*** 0.0031 -0.0006 0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0046 0.0023
(0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0018)
Conditioning Variable -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0000 0.0007 -0.0031*** -0.0016 -0.0041** 0.0017
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0011)
CDS Introduction 0.0012 0.0019 0.0021 0.0020 0.0011 0.0011 0.0013 0.0012 0.0028 0.0025
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822 80,822
Adj. R -Squared 0.263 0.265 0.266 0.264 0.264 0.265 0.268 0.264 0.274 0.267
CDS Introduction  x 
Conditioning Variable
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Table E4. Robustness tests 
The table shows the average treatment effect of CDS introductions on the market leverage of the treated firms (ATET) using overlap weights (Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky 
2018). Market leverage is defined as the sum of total debt and preferred stock divided by market value of total assets. The treatment is the introduction of CDS (i.e., only 
the first year of CDS trading for each firm). The regressions further include CDS interaction effects with lagged (standardized) conditioning variables, as well as the 
lagged conditioning variables themselves and lagged firm characteristics. The use of overlap weights ensures that covariates are perfectly balanced between treated firms 
and control firms in the year before treatment (see Table E2 in Appendix E). Conditioning variables are grouped into three categories: (1) creditor rights, (2) property 
rights, and (3) equity ownership concentration. For creditor rights, we use an aggregate index (Creditor Rights) as well as its four subindexes, namely, restrictions on a firm 
entering reorganization without creditors’ consent (Restrictions on Entry); no automatic stay or asset freeze (No Automatic Stay); restriction on management’s administration 
of a firm’s assets pending resolution of the reorganization (Management Does Not Stay); and payment of secured creditors first out of any liquidation proceeds (Secured 
Creditors First). For property rights, we consider the following three measures: Law & Order, Corruption, and Political Risk, where higher index values indicate stronger 
protection for private properties. For equity ownership concentration, we use the percentage of closely held shares (Closely Held Shares). Lagged firm characteristics are 
Debt Maturity, Market/Book, PPE/Size, Cash Flow/Sales, Cash and Short-term Investments/Total Assets (log), Total Assets in USD (log), ROA Volatility (log), Tax Rate, and Leverage 
Market Value (Industry Median). All regressions also include year and Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported 
in parentheses. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 countries over the period 2001–2015. Market data are from 
Datastream; accounting data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. All variables are defined in Appendix D. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 













Order Corruption Political Risk
0.0048 0.0146** -0.0003 -0.0056 0.0105 -0.0138** -0.0065 -0.0280*** 0.0132**
(0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0051) (0.0064) (0.0055) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0053)
Conditioning Variable -0.0026 -0.0042 -0.0036 0.0075** -0.0127*** -0.0022 -0.0132*** 0.0016 0.0112***
(0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0030)
CDS Introduction 0.0127** 0.0137*** 0.0151*** 0.0126** 0.0120** 0.0118** 0.0150*** 0.0131** 0.0221*** 0.0201***
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0063)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501
Adj. R -Squared 0.341 0.341 0.343 0.341 0.342 0.344 0.345 0.348 0.349 0.354
CDS Introduction  x 
Conditioning Variable
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Table E5. OLS regressions of CDS effects 
The table shows the results from OLS regressions of market leverage on CDS introductions (i.e., only the first year of CDS trading for each firm) and their interaction 
effects with lagged (standardized) conditioning variables, as well as the lagged conditioning variables themselves and lagged firm characteristics. Market leverage is defined 
as the sum of total debt and preferred stock divided by the market value of total assets. Conditioning variables are grouped into three categories: (1) creditor rights, (2) 
property rights, and (3) equity ownership concentration. For creditor rights, we use an aggregate index (Creditor Rights) as well as its four subindexes, namely, restrictions 
on a firm entering reorganization without creditors’ consent (Restrictions on Entry); no automatic stay or asset freeze (No Automatic Stay); restriction on management’s 
administration of a firm’s assets pending resolution of the reorganization (Management Does Not Stay); and payment of secured creditors first out of any liquidation proceeds 
(Secured Creditors First). For property rights, we consider the following three measures: Law & Order, Corruption, and Political Risk, where higher index values indicate 
stronger protection for private properties. For equity ownership concentration, we use the percentage of closely held shares (Closely Held Shares). The lagged firm charac-
teristics are Debt Maturity, Market/Book, PPE/Size, Cash Flow/Sales, Cash and Short-term Investments/Total Assets (log), Total Assets in USD (log), ROA Volatility (log), Tax Rate, 
and Leverage Market Value (Industry Median). All regressions also include year and Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
are reported in parentheses. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of more than 56,000 nonfinancial firms across 51 countries over the period 2001–2015. Market 
data are from Datastream; accounting data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. All variables are defined in Appendix D. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 













Order Corruption Political Risk
0.0048 0.0122** -0.0006 0.0057 -0.0096* -0.0160*** -0.0182*** -0.0186*** 0.0227***
(0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0047)
Conditioning Variable 0.0057*** 0.0038*** 0.0026*** 0.0059*** 0.0002 -0.0067*** -0.0123*** -0.0077*** 0.0080***
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009)
CDS Introduction 0.0358*** 0.0376*** 0.0385*** 0.0361*** 0.0371*** 0.0368*** 0.0391*** 0.0365*** 0.0421*** 0.0514***
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0059)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 108,844 108,844 108,844 108,844 108,844 108,844 108,844 108,844 108,844 108,844
Adj. R -Squared 0.225 0.226 0.225 0.225 0.226 0.225 0.226 0.229 0.226 0.227
CDS Introduction  x 
Conditioning Variable
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Table E6. Results excluding U.S. firms 
The table shows the average treatment effect of CDS introductions for non-US firms on the market leverage (defined as the sum of total debt and preferred stock divided 
by the market value of total assets) of the treated firms (ATET) using overlap weights (Li, Morgan, and Zaslavsky 2018). The treatment is the introduction of CDS (i.e., 
only the first year of CDS trading for each firm). The regressions further include CDS interaction effects with lagged (standardized) conditioning variables, as well as the 
lagged conditioning variables themselves. The use of overlap weights ensures that covariates are perfectly balanced between treated firms and control firms in the year 
before treatment (see Table E2 in Appendix E). Conditioning variables are grouped into three categories: (1) creditor rights, (2) property rights, and (3) equity ownership 
concentration. For creditor rights, we use an aggregate index (Creditor Rights) as well as its four subindexes, namely, restrictions on a firm entering reorganization without 
creditors’ consent (Restrictions on Entry); no automatic stay or asset freeze (No Automatic Stay); restriction on management’s administration of a firm’s assets pending 
resolution of the reorganization (Management Does Not Stay); and payment of secured creditors first out of any liquidation proceeds (Secured Creditors First). For property 
rights, we consider the following three measures: Law & Order, Corruption, and Political Risk, where higher index values indicate stronger protection for private properties. 
For equity ownership concentration, we use the percentage of closely held shares (Closely Held Shares). All regressions include year and Fama-French 48-industry fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of nonfinancial firms across 50 
countries over the period 2001–2015. Market data are from Datastream; accounting data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. All variables are defined 
in Appendix D. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 
 













Order Corruption Political Risk
0.0095 0.0190*** -0.0021 -0.0083 0.0149** -0.0185*** -0.0080 -0.0286*** 0.0218***
(0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0086) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0080) (0.0077) (0.0075)
Conditioning Variable -0.0146*** -0.0206*** -0.0064 0.0007 -0.0083** 0.0030 -0.0094** 0.0037 -0.0000
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0049) (0.0041)
CDS Introduction 0.0115 0.0099 0.0104 0.0115 0.0150* 0.0125* 0.0103 0.0104 0.0196*** 0.0172**
(0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0082) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0075) (0.0075)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 65,947 65,947 65,947 65,947 65,947 65,947 65,947 65,947 65,947 65,947
Adj. R -Squared 0.207 0.212 0.216 0.209 0.208 0.210 0.212 0.213 0.217 0.214
CDS Introduction  x 
Conditioning Variable
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Table E7. Role of the bang protocols on the effect on leverage of a CDS intro-
duction 
The table shows the average treatment effect of CDS introductions on the market leverage (defined as the sum of total 
debt and preferred stock divided by market value of total assets) of the treated (ATET) using overlap weights (Li, Morgan, 
and Zaslavsky 2018) for the full sample (panel A) and for sample firms excluding firms from North America (panel B), 
respectively. The treatment is the introduction of CDSs (i.e., only the first year of CDS trading for each firm). The post-
Bang dummy has a value equal to 1 for years after 2008 (and zero otherwise). The regressions further include interactions 
between CDS Introduction, Post-Bang Dummy, and lagged (standardized) conditioning variables, as well as the lagged condi-
tioning variables themselves. The use of overlap weights ensures that covariates are perfectly balanced between treated 
firms and control firms in the year before treatment (see Table E2 in Appendix E). Conditioning variables are an aggregate 
index (Creditor Rights) as well as its four subindexes, namely, restrictions on a firm entering reorganization without creditors’ 
consent (Restrictions on Entry); no automatic stay or asset freeze (No Automatic Stay); restriction on management’s admin-
istration of a firm’s assets pending resolution of the reorganization (Management Does Not Stay); and payment of secured 
creditors first out of any liquidation proceeds (Secured Creditors First). All regressions include Fama-French 48-industry fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. The sample consists of an unbal-
anced panel of nonfinancial firms across 51 countries over the period 2001–2015. Market data are from DataStream; 
accounting data are from WorldScope; and CDS data are from Markit. All variables are defined in Appendix D. *p < .1; 
**p < .05; ***p < .01. 
A. Full sample 
 
(continued) 












CDS Introduction  x Conditioning Variable x Post-Bang Dummy 0.0148 -0.0272 0.0233 0.0387* 0.0136
(0.0173) (0.0224) (0.0212) (0.0221) (0.0141)
CDS Introduction  x Conditioning Variable 0.0024 0.0196*** -0.0059 -0.0100* 0.0096
(0.0059) (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0059) (0.0065)
CDS Introduction  x Post-Bang Dummy 0.0149 0.0155 0.0115 0.0146 0.0197 0.0152
(0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0217) (0.0223) (0.0221)
Post-Bang Dummy x Conditioning Variable 0.0033 0.0144** 0.0098* -0.0117** 0.0024
(0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0047)
Conditioning Variable -0.0007 -0.0144*** 0.0005 0.0126*** -0.0084**
(0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0033)
Post-Bang Dummy -0.0081 -0.0074 -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0092 -0.0081
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0058)
CDS Introduction 0.0113* 0.0118* 0.0148** 0.0096 0.0102* 0.0105*
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Year Fixed-Effects No No No No No No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501 80,501
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Table E7. Role of the bang protocols on the effect on leverage of a CDS intro-
duction (continued) 
B. Sample excluding North American firms 
 
 












CDS Introduction  x Conditioning Variable x Post-Bang Dummy 0.0043 -0.0545** 0.0149 0.0440 0.0189
(0.0191) (0.0228) (0.0245) (0.0274) (0.0152)
CDS Introduction  x Conditioning Variable 0.0056 0.0242*** -0.0026 -0.0200** 0.0091
(0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0098) (0.0070)
CDS Introduction x Post-Bang Dummy 0.0394 0.0378 0.0518** 0.0338 0.0211 0.0441
(0.0267) (0.0264) (0.0259) (0.0284) (0.0271) (0.0276)
Post-Bang Dummy x Conditioning Variable 0.0086 0.0187*** 0.0123** -0.0186** 0.0027
(0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0073) (0.0049)
Conditioning Variable -0.0144***-0.0234*** -0.0068 0.0073 -0.0077**
(0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0036)
Post-Bang Dummy -0.0083 -0.0105 -0.0095 -0.0090 -0.0002 -0.0076
(0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0070)
CDS Introduction 0.0120 0.0101 0.0098 0.0115 0.0213** 0.0128*
(0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0094) (0.0077)
Year Fixed-Effects No No No No No No
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 64,146 64,146 64,146 64,146 64,146 64,146
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